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Market Discipline under Systemic Risk: Evidence from Bank Runs in Emerging Economies

Author

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  • Eduardo Levy Yeyati
  • Maria Soledad Martinez Peria
  • Sergio Schmukler

Abstract

This paper shows that systemic risk exerts a significant impact on the behavior of depositors, sometimes overshadowing their responses to standard bank fundamentals. Systemic risk can affect market discipline both regardless of and through bank fundamentals. First, worsening systemic conditions can directly threaten the value of deposits via dual agency problems. Second, systemic shocks can lead to a future deterioration of fundamentals and affect the exposure to systemic risk, not captured by standard fundamentals. Using data from the recent banking crises in Argentina and Uruguay, we show that market discipline is indeed quite robust once systemic risk is factored in. As the latter increases, the informational content of past fundamentals declines. These episodes also illustrate how few systemic shocks can trigger a run irrespective of ex-ante fundamentals. Overall, the evidence suggests that, in emerging economies, the notion of market discipline needs to account for systemic risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Maria Soledad Martinez Peria & Sergio Schmukler, 2004. "Market Discipline under Systemic Risk: Evidence from Bank Runs in Emerging Economies," Business School Working Papers systemicrisk, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
  • Handle: RePEc:udt:wpbsdt:systemicrisk
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gustavo Adler & Mr. Eugenio M Cerutti, 2015. "Are Foreign Banks a 'Safe Haven'? Evidence from Past Banking Crises," IMF Working Papers 2015/043, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Molyneux, Philip & Upreti, Vineet & Zhou, Tim, 2023. "Depositor market discipline: New evidence from selling failed banks," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    3. Agustin Villar, 2006. "Is financial stability policy now better placed to prevent systemic banking crises?," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), The banking system in emerging economies: how much progress has been made?, volume 28, pages 99-122, Bank for International Settlements.
    4. Das, Udaibir S. & Papaioannou, Michael G. & Trebesch, Christoph, . "Sovereign Default Risk and Private Sector Access to Capital in Emerging Markets," Chapters in Economics,, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    5. Edgar Tovar-García, 2014. "Market discipline: a review of the Mexican deposit market," Latin American Economic Review, Springer;Centro de Investigaciòn y Docencia Económica (CIDE), vol. 23(1), pages 1-33, December.
    6. Hasan, Iftekhar & Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Kowalewski, Oskar & Kozłowski, Łukasz, 2013. "Market discipline during crisis: Evidence from bank depositors in transition countries," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 5436-5451.
    7. Paolo Manasse & Roberto Savona & Marika Vezzoli, 2016. "Danger Zones for Banking Crises in Emerging Markets," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(4), pages 360-381, October.
    8. Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Maria Soledad Martinez Peria & Sergio Schmukler, 2004. "Market Discipline in Emerging Economies: Beyond Bank Fundamentals," Business School Working Papers marketdiscipline, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    9. Mr. Renzo G Avesani, 2005. "FIRST: A Market-Based Approach to Evaluate Financial System Risk and Stability," IMF Working Papers 2005/232, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Bednarek, Peter & Dinger, Valeriya & von Westernhagen, Natalja, 2015. "Fundamentals matter: Idiosyncratic shocks and interbank relations," Discussion Papers 44/2015, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    11. Research Group, Development, 2008. "Lessons from World Bank Research on Financial Crises," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4779, The World Bank.
    12. Diego Aparicio & Daniel Fraiman, 2015. "Banking Networks And Leverage Dependence In Emerging Countries," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(07n08), pages 1-21, November.
    13. Allen N. Berger & Martien Lamers & Raluca A. Roman & Koen Schoors, 2020. "Unexpected Effects of Bank Bailouts:Depositors Need Not Apply and Need Not Run," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 20/1005, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    14. Hasan, Iftekhar & Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Kowalewski, Oskar & Kozłowski, Łukasz, 2013. "Market discipline during crisis: Evidence from bank depositors in transition countries," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 5436-5451.
    15. Philip Molyneux & Vineet Upreti & Tim Zhou, 2022. "Depositor Market Discipline: New Evidence from Selling Failed Banks," Working Papers 2022-03, Swansea University, School of Management.
    16. Diego Aparicio & Daniel Fraiman, 2015. "Banking Networks and Leverage Dependence: Evidence from Selected Emerging Countries," Papers 1507.01901, arXiv.org.
    17. Ghosh, Saibal & Das, Abhiman, 2005. "Market Discipline, Capital Adequacy and Bank Behaviour: Theory and Indian Evidence," MPRA Paper 17398, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Mr. Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Mr. Alain Ize, 2005. "Financial De-Dollarization: Is it for Real?," IMF Working Papers 2005/187, International Monetary Fund.
    19. repec:zbw:bofitp:2013_021 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Fazelina Sahul Hamid, 2015. "Dynamic Depositor Discipline: Evidence Based on East Asian Banks," Margin: The Journal of Applied Economic Research, National Council of Applied Economic Research, vol. 9(3), pages 218-253, August.
    21. Polsiri, Piruna & Wiwattanakantang, Yupana & ウィワッタナカンタン, ユパナ, 2006. "Corporate Governance of Banks in Thailand," CEI Working Paper Series 2005-20, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    22. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Dollars, Debt and the IFIs: Dedollarizing Multilateral Lending," Business School Working Papers dedollmultlending, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    23. Christoph Trebesch, 2009. "The Cost of Aggressive Sovereign Debt Policies: How Much is theprivate Sector Affected?," IMF Working Papers 2009/029, International Monetary Fund.

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    JEL classification:

    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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