This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

MODIS: A Market-Oriented Deposit Insurance Scheme

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Reza Vaez-Zadeh (IMF)
Danyang Xie (IMF)
Edda Zoli (IMF)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper argues that an optimal deposit insurance scheme would allow the level of insurance coverage to be determined by the market. Based on this principle, the paper proposes an insurance scheme that minimizes distortions and embodies fairness and credibility, two essential characteristics of a viable and effective deposit insurance scheme. Using a simple model for the determination of the optimal level of insurance coverage, it is shown that the optimal coverage is higher for developing compared to developed countries; a condition that is broadly satisfied by prevailing deposit insurance practices around the world.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/fin/papers/0212/0212001.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Finance with number 0212001.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 03 Dec 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0212001

Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP;
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://129.3.20.41

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (EconWPA).

Related research
Keywords: Deposit Insurance Market-Oriented Approach

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Reint Gropp & Jukka M. Vesala, 2001. "Deposit insurance and moral hazard: does the counterfactual matter?," Working Paper Series 47, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Schumacher, Liliana, 2000. "Bank runs and currency run in a system without a safety net: Argentina and the 'tequila' shock," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 257-277, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Acharya, Sankarshan & Dreyfus, Jean-Francois, 1989. " Optimal Bank Reorganization Policies and the Pricing of Federal Deposit Insurance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(5), pages 1313-33, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. DEWATRIPONT, Mathias & TIROLE, Jean, 1992. "Efficient Governance Structure : Implications for Banking Regulation," IDEI Working Papers 18, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  5. Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 1998. "Financial Opening, Deposit Insurance, and Risk in a Model of Banking Competition," IMF Working Papers 98/97, International Monetary Fund.
    Other versions:
  6. Bryant, John, 1980. "A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 335-344, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Matutes, Carmen & Vives, Xavier, 1996. "Competition for Deposits, Fragility, and Insurance," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 184-216, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Park, Sangkyun & Peristiani, Stavros, 1998. "Market Discipline by Thrift Depositors," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 347-64, August.
  9. Enrica Detragiache & Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, 1997. "The Determinants of Banking Crises - Evidence from Developing and Developed Countries," IMF Working Papers 97/106, International Monetary Fund.
  10. Calomiris, Charles W., 1999. "Building an incentive-compatible safety net," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(10), pages 1499-1519, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Kim, Daesik & Santomero, Anthony M, 1988. " Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(5), pages 1219-33, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Rebecca S. Demsetz & Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip E. Strahan, 1996. "Banks with something to lose: the disciplinary role of franchise value," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 1-14. [Downloadable!]
  13. Frederick T. Furlong & Michael C. Keeley, 1987. "Bank capital regulation and asset risk," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Spr, pages 20-40. [Downloadable!]
  14. Kerfriden, C. & Rochet, J.C., 1993. "Actuarial Pricing of Deposit Insurance," Papers 93.289, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
    Other versions:
  15. Urs Birchler & Andréa M. Maechler, 2001. "Do Depositors Discipline Swiss Banks?," Working Papers 01.06, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee. [Downloadable!]
  16. James, Christopher, 1990. "Heterogeneous creditors and the market value of bank LDC loan portfolios," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 325-346, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. anonymous, 1999. "Using subordinated debt as an instrument of market discipline," Staff Studies 172, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  19. Gennotte, Gerard & Pyle, David, 1991. "Capital controls and bank risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(4-5), pages 805-824, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  21. Park, Sangkyun, 1995. "Market discipline by depositors: Evidence from reduced-form equations," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(35), pages 497-514. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Karels, Gordon V. & McClatchey, Christine A., 1999. "Deposit insurance and risk-taking behavior in the credit union industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 105-134, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Pennacchi, George G., 1987. "Alternative forms of deposit insurance : Pricing and bank incentive issues," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 291-312, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Kareken, John H & Wallace, Neil, 1978. "Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilibrium Exposition," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 413-38, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Herbert Baer & Elijah Brewer, 1986. "Uninsured deposits as a source of market discipline: some new evidence," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Sep, pages 23-31.
  26. Thakor, Anjan V., 2000. "Relationship Banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 3-5, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Goldberg, Lawrence G. & Hudgins, Sylvia C., 1996. "Response of uninsured depositors to impending S&L failures: Evidence of depositor discipline," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 311-325. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. R. Alton Gilbert, 1990. "Market discipline of bank risk: theory and evidence," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jan, pages 3-18. [Downloadable!]
  29. Hannan, Timothy H & Hanweck, Gerald A, 1988. "Bank Insolvency Risk and the Market for Large Certificates of Deposit," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(2), pages 203-11, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  30. G. G. Garcia, 1999. "Deposit Insurance - A Survey of Actual and Best Practices," IMF Working Papers 99/54, International Monetary Fund.
  31. Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, 2001. "Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(3), pages 1029-1051, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  32. Arthur J. Rolnick, 1987. "The benefits of bank deposit rate ceilings: new evidence on bank rates and risk in the 1920's," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Sum, pages 2-18. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can use IDEAS to provide links to papers and articles in your course syllabus.

This page was last updated on 2008-10-2.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.