Response of uninsured depositors to impending S&L failures: Evidence of depositor discipline
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance.
Volume (Year): 36 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620167
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Maria Soledad Martinez Peria & Sergio Schmukler, 2004.
"Market Discipline under Systemic Risk: Evidence from Bank Runs in Emerging Economies,"
Business School Working Papers
systemicrisk, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
- Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo & Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad & Schmukler, Sergio L., 2004. "Market discipline under systemic risk - evidence from bank runs in emerging economies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3440, The World Bank.
- Sergio L. Schmukler & Eduardo Levy-Yeyati & Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, 2004. "Market Discipline under Systemic Risk: Evidence from Bank Runs in Emerging Economies," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 318, Econometric Society.
- María Soledad Martínez-Peria & Sergio Schmukler, 2002.
"Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises,"
Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series,
in: Leonardo Hernández & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (S (ed.), Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 5, pages 143-174
Central Bank of Chile.
- Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, 2001. "Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(3), pages 1029-1051, 06.
- Goldberg, Lawrence G. & Hudgins, Sylvia C., 2002. "Depositor discipline and changing strategies for regulating thrift institutions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 263-274, February.
- Konstantinos Drakos, 2012. "US banks' capitalization speed-of-adjustment: a microeconometric approach," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 4(3), pages 270-286, August.
- Reza Vaez-Zadeh & Danyang Xie & Edda Zoli, 2002. "MODIS: A Market-Oriented Deposit Insurance Scheme," Finance 0212001, EconWPA.
- Rajkamal Iyer & Manju Puri & Nicholas Ryan, 2013. "Do Depositors Monitor Banks?," NBER Working Papers 19050, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edda Zoli & Danyang Xie & Reza Vaez-Zadeh, 2002. "Modis," IMF Working Papers 02/207, International Monetary Fund.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.