This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Política de clientelas y reformas de la Seguridad Social en América Latina

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Alvaro Forteza (Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Social Security systems in Latin America prior to the reforms exhibited some problems that have been reported also in other parts of the world, including OECD countries. This is the case for instance of the increasing pressure that the pension system put on fiscal accounts. Other problems that are frequent in the region do not seem to be present in developed countries. Large evasion, low coverage, informality, lack of transparency and unclear rules of the game are problems usually quoted in reports and studies about Latin American countries and are not mentioned for OECD countries. This essay presents some preliminary results of a research program aimed at determining the nature of these problems, gathering empirical evidence, proposing some explanatory hypotheses and analyzing the implications for the design of reforms. One of the main hypotheses analyzed in this paper is that the Social Security systems in the region were managed in a clientelistic logic favored by the lack of transparency and discretionality of the administrations. On the normative side, it is hypothesized that recent reforms in Latin America reduced the scope for clientelistic behavior in Social Security.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://decon.edu.uy/publica/1999/Doc1899.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics - dECON in its series Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) with number 1899.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Oct 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:1899

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Constituyente 1502, 6to piso, CP 11200, Montevideo
Phone: (598 2) 410-6449
Fax: (598 2) 410-6450
Email:
Web page: http://www.decon.edu.uy/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Carmen Estrades) or (Héctor Pastori).

Related research
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E69 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Other
H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Alvaro Forteza, 1998. "Los efectos fiscales de la Reforma de la Seguridad Social uruguaya," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0898, Department of Economics - dECON. [Downloadable!]
  2. Herrendorf, Berthold, 1999. "Transparency, reputation, and credibility under floating and pegged exchange rates," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 31-50, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jon Faust & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and credibility: monetary policy with unobservable goals," International Finance Discussion Papers 605, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Credibility and politics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 542-550, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Álvaro Forteza, 1999. "Government discretionary transfers and overinsurance," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 26(1 Year 19), pages 27-44, June. [Downloadable!]
  6. Olivia S. Mitchell & Flavio Ataliba Barreto, 1997. "After Chile, What? Second-Round Pension Reforms in Latin America," NBER Working Papers 6316, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1999. "Social Security in Theory and Practice (I): Facts and Political Theories," Economics Working Papers 384, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can include your works in the database easily by uploading them on the Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) if you do not have access to an institutional RePEc archive.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-3.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.