This paper summarizes our simulations of the fiscal effects of the recent reform of the Uruguayan pension system for the 1996-2050 period. According to our results, fiscal effects of the reform crucially depend on what happens with the retirement age and with evasion in the new regime. We get permanent increases of the fiscal deficit and public debt, if average retirement age does not change significantly and there is no reduction in evasion. The reform can cause sustainable fiscal deficit and public debt reduction, instead, if average retirement age rises in at least two years or evasion is substantially reduced. In this sense, we conclude that fiscal success of the reform rests on its ability to reduce evasion or to induce retirement postponement.
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