Free riding and norms of control: self determination and imposition. An experimental comparison
AbstractThis is an experiment on the effect of norm application in a public good game. We want to investigate whether a control norm affects the contribution level differently, only in relation to the way in which the norm is applied in the game. We compare the amount of public good provided in two different groups. In the first group (constituent group), experimental subjects create a control norm, and then they self-apply it in a basic public good game. In the second group (control group), the norm created by the constituent group is exogenously imposed. Experimental results show a significant difference between the two public good levels considered. Self determination implies a higher level of efficiency, as compared to the exogenous one.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia in its series CEEL Working Papers with number 0704.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
public good games; free riding; norm of control; voluntary contribution;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-07-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-07-07 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2007-07-07 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-07-07 (Game Theory)
- NEP-PBE-2007-07-07 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2007-07-07 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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