IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tiu/tiutis/215d796f-09fd-4231-a02d-178555516525.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The effects of access to health insurance: Evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Peru

Author

Listed:
  • Bernal Lobato, Noelia

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Carpio, M.A.
  • Klein, Tobias

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

In many countries large parts of the population do not have access to health insurance. Peru has made an effort to change this in the early 2000s. The institutional setup gives rise to the rare opportunity to study the effects of health insurance coverage exploiting a sharp regression discontinuity design. We find large effects on utilization that are most pronounced for the provision of curative care. Individuals seeing a doctor leads to increased awareness about health problems and generates a potentially desirable form of supplier-induced demand: they decide to pay themselves for services that are in short supply.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Bernal Lobato, Noelia & Carpio, M.A. & Klein, Tobias, 2017. "The effects of access to health insurance: Evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Peru," Other publications TiSEM 215d796f-09fd-4231-a02d-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:215d796f-09fd-4231-a02d-178555516525
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/19032326/The_effects_of_access_to_health_insurance.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dow, William H. & Schmeer, Kammi K., 2003. "Health insurance and child mortality in Costa Rica," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 57(6), pages 975-986, September.
    2. Erich Battistin & Agar Brugiavini & Enrico Rettore & Guglielmo Weber, 2009. "The Retirement Consumption Puzzle: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 2209-2226, December.
    3. Frandsen, Brigham R. & Frölich, Markus & Melly, Blaise, 2012. "Quantile treatment effects in the regression discontinuity design," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 168(2), pages 382-395.
    4. Patrick Bajari & Han Hong & Ahmed Khwaja, 2006. "Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Health Expenditures: A Semiparametric Analysis," NBER Working Papers 12445, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. John Strauss & Duncan Thomas, 1998. "Health, Nutrition, and Economic Development," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 766-817, June.
    6. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Stephen P. Ryan & Paul Schrimpf & Mark R. Cullen, 2013. "Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 178-219, February.
    7. William C. Hsiao & R. Paul Shaw, 2007. "Social Health Insurance for Developing Nations," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 6860, December.
    8. Janet Currie & Jonathan Gruber, 1996. "Health Insurance Eligibility, Utilization of Medical Care, and Child Health," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(2), pages 431-466.
    9. Jonathan Gruber & Nathaniel Hendren & Robert M. Townsend, 2014. "The Great Equalizer: Health Care Access and Infant Mortality in Thailand," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 91-107, January.
    10. Sebastian Calonico & Matias D. Cattaneo & Rocio Titiunik, 2014. "Robust Nonparametric Confidence Intervals for Regression‐Discontinuity Designs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82, pages 2295-2326, November.
    11. Rodrigo Barros, 2008. "Wealthier But Not Much Healthier: Effects of a Health Insurance Program for the Poor in Mexico," Discussion Papers 09-002, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    12. Rebecca M. Blank & David E. Card, 1991. "Recent Trends in Insured and Uninsured Unemployment: Is There an Explanation?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(4), pages 1157-1189.
    13. Klein, Tobias J., 2010. "Heterogeneous treatment effects: Instrumental variables without monotonicity?," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 155(2), pages 99-116, April.
    14. Hanming Fang & Michael P. Keane & Dan Silverman, 2008. "Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 303-350, April.
    15. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Esther Duflo, 2007. "The Economic Lives of the Poor," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 141-168, Winter.
    16. Wagstaff, Adam & Lindelow, Magnus, 2008. "Can insurance increase financial risk?: The curious case of health insurance in China," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 990-1005, July.
    17. Cutler, David M. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2000. "The anatomy of health insurance," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 563-643, Elsevier.
    18. Xavier Giné & Robert Townsend & James Vickery, 2008. "Patterns of Rainfall Insurance Participation in Rural India," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 22(3), pages 539-566, October.
    19. Kristina Shampanier & Nina Mazar & Dan Ariely, 2007. "Zero as a Special Price: The True Value of Free Products," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 26(6), pages 742-757, 11-12.
    20. Sosa-Rubí, Sandra G. & Galárraga, Omar & Harris, Jeffrey E., 2009. "Heterogeneous impact of the "Seguro Popular" program on the utilization of obstetrical services in Mexico, 2001-2006: A multinomial probit model with a discrete endogenous variable," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 20-34, January.
    21. Jaap H. Abbring & Pierre-André Chiappori & Jean Pinquet, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 767-820, June.
    22. Imbens, Guido W. & Lemieux, Thomas, 2008. "Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 615-635, February.
    23. McGuire, Thomas G., 2000. "Physician agency," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 461-536, Elsevier.
    24. James J. Choi & David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, 2011. "$100 Bills on the Sidewalk: Suboptimal Investment in 401(k) Plans," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 93(3), pages 748-763, August.
    25. Aviva Aron-Dine & Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, 2013. "The RAND Health Insurance Experiment, Three Decades Later," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(1), pages 197-222, Winter.
    26. Jishnu Das & Jeffrey Hammer & Kenneth Leonard, 2008. "The Quality of Medical Advice in Low-Income Countries," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 22(2), pages 93-114, Spring.
    27. Grant Miller & Diana Pinto & Marcos Vera-Hernández, 2013. "Risk Protection, Service Use, and Health Outcomes under Colombia's Health Insurance Program for the Poor," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 61-91, October.
    28. Hahn, Jinyong & Todd, Petra & Van der Klaauw, Wilbert, 2001. "Identification and Estimation of Treatment Effects with a Regression-Discontinuity Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 201-209, January.
    29. Marcle Fafchamps, 1999. "Risk sharing and quasi-credit," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(3), pages 257-278.
    30. Amy Finkelstein & Sarah Taubman & Bill Wright & Mira Bernstein & Jonathan Gruber & Joseph P. Newhouse & Heidi Allen & Katherine Baicker, 2012. "The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First Year," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(3), pages 1057-1106.
    31. Acharya, Arnab & Vellakkal, Sukumar & Taylor Fiona & Masset Edoardo & Satija, Ambika & Burke, Margaret & Ebrahim, Shah, 2013. "The impact of health insurance schemes for the informal sector in low- and middle-income countries : a systematic review," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6324, The World Bank.
    32. Wagstaff, Adam & Lindelow, Magnus & Jun, Gao & Ling, Xu & Juncheng, Qian, 2009. "Extending health insurance to the rural population: An impact evaluation of China's new cooperative medical scheme," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-19, January.
    33. Sebastian Bauhoff & David R. Hotchkiss & Owen Smith, 2011. "The impact of medical insurance for the poor in Georgia: a regression discontinuity approach," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(11), pages 1362-1378, November.
    34. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    35. Rebecca L. Thornton & Laurel E. Hatt & Erica M. Field & Mursaleena Islam & Freddy Solís Diaz & Martha Azucena González, 2010. "Social security health insurance for the informal sector in Nicaragua: a randomized evaluation," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(S1), pages 181-206, September.
    36. Abhijit Banerjee & Angus Deaton & Esther Duflo, 2004. "Wealth, Health, and Health Services in Rural Rajasthan," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 326-330, May.
    37. Aviva Aron-Dine & Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Mark Cullen, 2015. "Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: Do Dynamic Incentives Matter?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 97(4), pages 725-741, October.
    38. Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, 2004. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(1), pages 183-208, February.
    39. Lu, Fangwen, 2014. "Insurance coverage and agency problems in doctor prescriptions: Evidence from a field experiment in China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 156-167.
    40. Matthew Jowett, 2003. "Do informal risk sharing networks crowd out public voluntary health insurance? Evidence from Vietnam," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(10), pages 1153-1161.
    41. Adam Wagstaff, 2010. "Estimating health insurance impacts under unobserved heterogeneity: the case of Vietnam's health care fund for the poor," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(2), pages 189-208, February.
    42. Rebecca M. Blank & Patricia Ruggles, 1996. "When Do Women Use Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Food Stamps? The Dynamics of Eligibility Versus Participation," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 31(1), pages 57-89.
    43. Adam Wagstaff & Eddy van Doorslaer, 2003. "Catastrophe and impoverishment in paying for health care: with applications to Vietnam 1993–1998," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(11), pages 921-933, November.
    44. Jaap H. Abbring & James J. Heckman & Pierre-André Chiappori & Jean Pinquet, 2003. "Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard In Insurance: Can Dynamic Data Help to Distinguish?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 512-521, 04/05.
    45. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Salanie, 2000. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(1), pages 56-78, February.
    46. Jaap H. Abbring & Pierre-André Chiappori & Jean Pinquet, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 767-820, June.
    47. McCrary, Justin, 2008. "Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: A density test," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 698-714, February.
    48. Zweifel, Peter & Manning, Willard G., 2000. "Moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 409-459, Elsevier.
    49. Eric French & John Bailey Jones, 2004. "On the distribution and dynamics of health care costs," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(6), pages 705-721.
    50. Arnab Acharya & Sukumar Vellakkal & Fiona Taylor & Edoardo Masset & Ambika Satija & Margaret Burke & Shah Ebrahim, 2013. "The Impact of Health Insurance Schemes for the Informal Sector in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: A Systematic Review," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 28(2), pages 236-266, August.
    51. World Bank, 2013. "World Development Indicators 2013," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 13191, December.
    52. Limwattananon, Supon & Neelsen, Sven & O'Donnell, Owen & Prakongsai, Phusit & Tangcharoensathien, Viroj & van Doorslaer, Eddy & Vongmongkol, Vuthiphan, 2015. "Universal coverage with supply-side reform: The impact on medical expenditure risk and utilization in Thailand," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 79-94.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bernal, Noelia & Carpio, Miguel A. & Klein, Tobias J., 2017. "The effects of access to health insurance: Evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Peru," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 122-136.
    2. Bernal Lobato, N., 2014. "Essays in applied microeconomics," Other publications TiSEM 9b638b3d-2f83-452a-b2c8-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Powell, David & Goldman, Dana, 2021. "Disentangling moral hazard and adverse selection in private health insurance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 222(1), pages 141-160.
    4. Raj Chetty & Amy Finkelstein, 2012. "Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data," NBER Working Papers 18433, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Tobias J. Klein & Christian Lambertz & Konrad O. Stahl, 2016. "Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(6), pages 1677-1713.
    6. Lin, Lin & Zai, Xianhua, 2022. "The Power of Public Insurance With Limited Benefits: Evidence from China's New Cooperative Medical Scheme," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1180, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    7. Lin Lin & Xianhua Zai, 2022. "The role of supply responses in public insurance expansion: evidence from China's New Cooperative Medical Scheme," MPIDR Working Papers WP-2022-025, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany.
    8. Spenkuch, Jörg L., 2012. "Moral hazard and selection among the poor: Evidence from a randomized experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 72-85.
    9. Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, "undated". "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Working Papers 620, Barcelona School of Economics.
    10. Klein, T.J. & Lambertz, C. & Stahl, K., 2013. "Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Anonymous Markets," Discussion Paper 2013-032, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    11. Bernal, Noelia & Costa-Font, Joan & Ritter, Patricia, 2022. "The Effect of Health Insurance on Child Nutritional Outcomes. Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design in Peru," IZA Discussion Papers 15490, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Jonathan Levin, 2010. "Beyond Testing: Empirical Models of Insurance Markets," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 311-336, September.
    13. Miguel Ángel Carpio & Lucero Gómez & Pablo Lavado, 2021. "Does social health insurance spillover to student performance? Evidence from an RDD in Peru," Working Papers 178, Peruvian Economic Association.
    14. Acharya, Arnab & Vellakkal, Sukumar & Taylor Fiona & Masset Edoardo & Satija, Ambika & Burke, Margaret & Ebrahim, Shah, 2013. "The impact of health insurance schemes for the informal sector in low- and middle-income countries : a systematic review," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6324, The World Bank.
    15. Spenkch, Jörg L., 2011. "Adverse selection and moral hazard among the poor: evidence from a randomized experiment," MPRA Paper 31443, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Emily Gustafsson-Wright & Gosia Popławska & Zlata Tanović & Jacques Gaag, 2018. "The impact of subsidized private health insurance and health facility upgrades on healthcare utilization and spending in rural Nigeria," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 221-276, September.
    17. Patrick Bajari & Han Hong & Ahmed Khwaja, 2006. "Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Health Expenditures: A Semiparametric Analysis," NBER Working Papers 12445, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Paul Schrimpf, 2007. "The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market," NBER Working Papers 13228, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Mengna Luan & Wenjing Shi & Zhigang Tao & Hongjie Yuan, 2023. "When patients have better insurance coverage in China: Provider incentives, costs, and quality of care," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 31(4), pages 1073-1106, October.
    20. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Mark R. Cullen, 2010. "Estimating Welfare in Insurance Markets Using Variation in Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(3), pages 877-921.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:215d796f-09fd-4231-a02d-178555516525. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Richard Broekman (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/about/schools/economics-and-management/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.