IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pri/indrel/243.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Recent Trends in Insured and Uninsured Unemployment: Is There an Explanation?

Author

Listed:
  • Rebecca Blank

    (Princeton University)

  • David Card

    (Princeton University)

Abstract

This paper presents new evidence on the reasons for the recent decline in the fraction of unemployed workers who receive unemployment insurance benefits. Using samples of unemployed workers from the March Current Population Survey, we estimate the fraction of unemployed workers who are potentially eligible for benefits in each year and compare this to the fraction who actually receive unemployment compensation. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that the decline in the fraction of insured unemployment is due to a decline in the takeup rate for benefits. Our estimates indicate that takeup rates declined abruptly between l98O and 1982, leading to a 6 percentage point decline in the fraction of the unemployed who receive benefits. We go on to analyse the determinants of the takeup rate for unemployment benefits, using both aggregated state-level data and micro-data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Changes in the regional distribution of unemployment account for roughly one-half of the decline in average takeup rates. The remainder of the change is largely unexplained.

Suggested Citation

  • Rebecca Blank & David Card, 1988. "Recent Trends in Insured and Uninsured Unemployment: Is There an Explanation?," Working Papers 623, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  • Handle: RePEc:pri:indrel:243
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://dataspace.princeton.edu/bitstream/88435/dsp01tt44pm86h/1/243revised.PDF
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary Burtless, 1983. "Why Is Insured Unemployment So Low?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 14(1), pages 225-254.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Julie Hotchkiss, 1999. "The effect of transitional employment on search duration: A selectivity approach," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 27(1), pages 38-52, March.
    2. Bryce Jones, 1991. "In aid of the unemployed," Forum for Social Economics, Springer;The Association for Social Economics, vol. 20(2), pages 16-32, March.
    3. Mukoyama, Toshihiko & Sahin, Aysegl, 2009. "Why did the average duration of unemployment become so much longer?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 200-209, March.
    4. Gary Burtless, 1998. "Relative Unemployment in Canada and the United States: An Assessment," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 24(s1), pages 254-263, February.
    5. Gordon F. Mulligan, 2023. "Economic vulnerability in US metropolitan areas," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 70(1), pages 29-53, February.
    6. Orley Ashenfelter & David Card, 1986. "Why Have Unemployment Rates in Canada and the U.S. Diverged?," Working Papers 584, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    7. Christopher J. O'Leary & Stephen A. Wandner, 2001. "Unemployment Compensation and Older Workers," Book chapters authored by Upjohn Institute researchers, in: Peter P. Budetti & Richard V. Burkhauser & Janice M. Gregory & H. Allan Hunt (ed.), Ensuring Health and Income Security for an Aging Workforce, pages 85-133, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    8. Michael Baker & Samuel A. Rea, 1998. "Employment Spells And Unemployment Insurance Eligibility Requirements," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(1), pages 80-94, February.
    9. Casey B. Mulligan, 2012. "Do Welfare Policies Matter for Labor Market Aggregates? Quantifying Safety Net Work Incentives since 2007," NBER Working Papers 18088, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Peter Hans Matthews & Ivan Kandilov & Bradford Maxwell, 2002. "Interstate differences in insured unemployment: some recent evidence," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(14), pages 945-948.
    11. Casey B. Mulligan, 2011. "The Expanding Social Safety Net," NBER Working Papers 17654, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Walter Corson & Karen Needels & Walter Nicholson, 1999. "Emergency Unemployment Compensation: The 1990s Experience," Mathematica Policy Research Reports 493d3f9bc06442df875644c62, Mathematica Policy Research.
    13. Rebecca M. Blank & Alan S. Blinder, 1985. "Macroeconomics, Income Distribution, and Poverty," NBER Working Papers 1567, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Francesco Spadafora, 2022. "Don’t let me down: unemployment insurance in the United States," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 673, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    15. Patricia M. Anderson & Bruce D. Meyer, 1994. "Unemployment Insurance Benefits and Takeup Rates," NBER Working Papers 4787, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Christopher J. O'Leary & Robert A. Straits, 2004. "Intergovernmental Relations in Employment Policy: The United States Experience," Book chapters authored by Upjohn Institute researchers, in: Alain Noel (ed.),Federalism and Labour market Policy: Comparing Different Governance and Employment Strategies, pages 25-82, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    17. Christopher J. O'Leary & Kenneth J. Kline & Thomas A. Stengle & Stephen A. Wandner, 2023. "Why Are Unemployment Insurance Claims So Low?," Upjohn Working Papers 23-383, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    18. repec:mpr:mprres:1832 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Schmid, Gunther, 1995. "Institutional incentives to prevent unemployment: Unemployment insurance and active labor market policy in a comparative perspective," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 51-103.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    unemployment insurance; insured unemployment; extended benefits; takeup rate;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pri:indrel:243. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bobray Bordelon (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/irprius.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.