Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Anonymous Markets
AbstractWe study the effects of improvements in eBay's rating mechanism on seller exit and continuing sellers' behavior. Following a large sample of sellers over time, we exploit the fact that the rating mechanism was changed to reduce strategic bias in buyer rating. That improvement did not lead to increased exit of poorly rated sellers. Yet, buyer valuation of the staying sellers – especially the poorly rated ones – improved significantly. By our preferred interpretation, the latter effect results from increased seller effort; also, when sellers have the choice between exiting (a reduction in adverse selection) and improved behavior (a reduction in moral hazard), then they prefer the latter because of lower cost.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 9501.
Date of creation: Jun 2013
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Klein, T.J. & Lambertz, C. & Stahl, K., 2013. "Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Anonymous Markets," Discussion Paper 2013-032, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Klein, Tobias J. & Lambertz, Christian & Stahl, Konrad O., 2013. "Adverse selection and moral hazard in anonymous markets," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-050, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-09-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-09-26 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2013-09-26 (Contract Theory & Applications)
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