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Selling to Consumers with Endogenous Types

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  • Boone, J.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Shapiro, J.

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Suggested Citation

  • Boone, J. & Shapiro, J., 2006. "Selling to Consumers with Endogenous Types," Other publications TiSEM 204f348b-5c07-415d-95a1-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:204f348b-5c07-415d-95a1-38fad239bf93
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Vasiliki Skreta, 2000. "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1521, Econometric Society.
    2. Driskill, Robert & McCafferty, Stephen, 2001. "Monopoly and Oligopoly Provision of Addictive Goods," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(1), pages 43-72, February.
    3. Atkeson Andrew & Lucas Jr. , Robert E., 1995. "Efficiency and Equality in a Simple Model of Efficient Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 64-88, June.
    4. Xavier Freixas & Roger Guesnerie & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(2), pages 173-191.
    5. Gabszewicz, Jean & Pepall, Lynne & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1992. "Sequential Entry with Brand Loyalty Caused by Consumer Learning-by-Using," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 397-416, December.
    6. Baron, David P. & Besanko, David, 1984. "Regulation and information in a continuing relationship," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 267-302.
    7. Becker, Gary S & Grossman, Michael & Murphy, Kevin M, 1994. "An Empirical Analysis of Cigarette Addiction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 396-418, June.
    8. Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1990. "Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 367-390, August.
    9. Townsend, Robert M, 1982. "Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1166-1186, December.
    10. Schlee, Edward E., 2001. "Buyer experimentation and introductory pricing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 347-362, March.
    11. Narayana R Kocherlakota, 2005. "Advances in Dynamic Optimal Taxation," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000518, UCLA Department of Economics.
    12. Tracy R. Lewis & Huseyin Yildirim, 2002. "Learning by Doing and Dynamic Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(1), pages 22-36, Spring.
    13. Showalter, Mark H., 1999. "Firm behavior in a market with addiction: the case of cigarettes," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 409-427, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dennis L. Gärtner, 2010. "Monopolistic screening under learning by doing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 574-597, September.
    2. Petal Jean Hackett, 2012. "Cutting too Close? Design Protection and Innovation in Fashion Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series 3716, CESifo.

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