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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 122 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 225-253

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:122:y:2005:i:2:p:225-253

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

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1. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1998. "Collateralized debt as the optimal contract," Working Paper 98-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
   
   • Jeffrey Lacker, 2001. "Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(4), pages 842-859, October.
2. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
3. Jeffrey Lacker, 2001. "Online Appendix to Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract," Technical Appendices lacker01, Review of Economic Dynamics.
   
   • Jeffrey Lacker, 2001. "Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(4), pages 842-859, October.
4. Zame, William R, 1993. "Efficiency and the Role of Default When Security Markets Are Incomplete," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1142-64, December.
   
   • William R. Zame, 1992. "Efficiency and the Role of Default When Security Markets are Incomplete," UCLA Economics Working Papers 673, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • William R. Zame, 1990. "Efficiency and the Role of Default When Security Markets are Incomplete," UCLA Economics Working Papers 585, UCLA Department of Economics.
5. Kjetil Storesletten & Chris I. Telmer & Amir Yaron, 2004. "Cyclical Dynamics in Idiosyncratic Labor Market Risk," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(3), pages 695-717, June.
6. Andrew Atkeson & Robert E Lucas, 2010. "On Efficient Distribution with Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2179, David K. Levine.
   
   • Atkeson, Andrew & Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1992. "On Efficient Distribution with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 427-53, July.
7. Atkeson Andrew & Lucas Jr. , Robert E., 1995. "Efficiency and Equality in a Simple Model of Efficient Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 64-88, June.
8. Kahn, Charles & Scheinkman, Jose, 1985. "Optimal employment contracts with bankruptcy constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 343-365, August.
9. Rochet, Jean-Charles & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(4), pages 733-62, November.
   
   • Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 1996. "Interbank lending and systemic risk," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 733-765.
10. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
11. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
12. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
13. Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 21-45, January.
    
    • Edward C Prescott & Robert M Townsend, 2010. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria With Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2069, David K. Levine.
14. Townsend, Robert M, 1982. "Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1166-86, December.
15. Robert Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    
    • Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
16. Rea, Samuel A, Jr, 1984. "Arm-breaking, Consumer Credit and Personal Bankruptcy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 22(2), pages 188-208, April.

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Cited by:

1. Susan Athey & Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2004. "The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy," Working Paper Series 338, European Central Bank.
   
   • Susan Athey & Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2005. "The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(5), pages 1431-1475, 09.
   • Susan Athey & Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2004. "The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy," Staff Report 326, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
   • Susan Athey & Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2004. "The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy," International Finance Discussion Papers 801, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
   • Susan Athey & Andrew Atkeson & Patrick Kehoe, 2003. "The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 10109, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   • Susan Athey & Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2002. "The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy," Working Papers 626, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
2. Borys Grochulski, 2008. "Optimal personal bankruptcy design : A Mirrlees approach," Working Paper 08-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
   
   • Borys Grochulski, 2007. "Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Design: A Mirrlees Approach," 2007 Meeting Papers 1008, Society for Economic Dynamics.
3. Cristina Arellano & Narayana Kocherlakota, 2008. "Internal Debt Crises and Sovereign Defaults," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001880, UCLA Department of Economics.
   
   • Narayana Kocherlakota & Cristina Arellano, 2008. "Internal Debt Crises and Sovereign Defaults," 2008 Meeting Papers 139, Society for Economic Dynamics.
   • Cristina Arellano & Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2008. "Internal Debt Crises and Sovereign Defaults," NBER Working Papers 13794, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
4. S. Viswanathan & Adriano A. Rampini, 2008. "Collateral, Financial Intermediation, and the Distribution of Debt Capacity," 2008 Meeting Papers 116, Society for Economic Dynamics.
5. Garrett, Thomas A. & Wall, Howard J., 2010. "Personal-bankruptcy cycles," MPRA Paper 30759, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   
   • Garrett, Thomas A. & Wall, Howard J., 2010. "Personal-bankruptcy cycles," MPRA Paper 42740, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Thomas A. Garrett & Howard J. Wall, 2010. "Personal-bankruptcy cycles," Working Papers 2010-010, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
6. Inderst, Roman, 2006. "Consumer Lending When Lenders are More Sophisticated Than Households," CEPR Discussion Papers 5410, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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