Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Fraud deterrence in dynamic Mirrleesian economies

Contents:

Author Info

  • Roc Armenter
  • Thomas M. Mertens

Abstract

Social and private insurance schemes rely on legal action to deter fraud and tax evasion. This observation guides the authors to introduce a random state verification technology in a dynamic economy with private information. With some probability, an agent's skill level becomes known to the planner, who prescribes a punishment if the agent is caught misreporting. The authors show how deferring consumption can ease the provision of incentives. As a result, the marginal benefit may be below the marginal cost of investment in the constrained-efficient allocation, suggesting a subsidy on savings. They characterize conditions such that the intertemporal wedge is negative in finite horizon economies. In an infinite horizon economy, the authors find that the constrained-efficient allocation converges to a high level of consumption, full insurance, and no labor distortions for any probability of state verification.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2010/wp10-7.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in its series Working Papers with number 10-7.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:10-7

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 10 Independence Mall, Philadelphia, PA 19106-1574
Web page: http://www.philadelphiafed.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/wps/index.html

Related research

Keywords: Insurance ; Fraud;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. B. Ravikumar & Yuzhe Zhang, 2011. "Optimal auditing and insurance in a dynamic model of tax compliance," Working Papers 2011-020, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:10-7

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Diane Rosenberger).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.