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Credit in a Random Matching Model With Private Information

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Author Info
S. Rao Aiyagari (University of Rochester)
Stephen D. Williamson (University of Iowa)

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Abstract

We consider a random matching model without monetary exchange where agents have complete access to each others’ histories. Exchange is motivated by risk sharing given random unobservable incomes. There is capital accumulation and an endogenous interest rate. The key feature of this environment is that information is mobile across location even while goods are not. Optimal allocations in the dynamic private information resemble real-world credit arrangements in that there are credit balances, credit limits, and installment payments. The steady state has the property that there is a limiting distribution of expected utility entitlements with mobility and a positive fraction of agents who are credit constrained.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9705005.

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Date of creation: 30 May 1997
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9705005

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Aiyagari, S Rao & Wallace, Neil, 1991. "Existence of Steady States with Positive Consumption in the Kiyotaki-Wright Model," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 58(5), pages 901-16, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Payments Systems with Random Matching and Private Information," Game Theory and Information 9802004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Wang, Cheng, 1995. "Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 62(4), pages 577-95, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Spear, Stephen E & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1987. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(4), pages 599-617, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Phelan, C. & Townsend, R.M., 1990. "Computing Multiperiod, Information-Constrained Optima," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 90-13, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
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  6. Atkeson, Andrew & Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1992. "On Efficient Distribution with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(3), pages 427-53, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Atkeson Andrew & Lucas Jr. , Robert E., 1995. "Efficiency and Equality in a Simple Model of Efficient Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 64-88, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1993. "A Search-Theoretic Approach to Monetary Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 63-77, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Aubhik Khan & B. Ravikumar, 2002. "Enduring relationships in an economy with capital," Working Papers 02-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  10. Aiyagari, S. Rao & Williamson, Stephen D., 2000. "Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 248-279, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1989. "On Money as a Medium of Exchange," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 927-54, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Williamson, Steve & Wright, Randall, 1994. "Barter and Monetary Exchange under Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 104-23, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1990. "Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 367-390, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Townsend, Robert M, 1982. "Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1166-86, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 1996. "Money is memory," Staff Report 218, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Khan, Aubhik & Ravikumar, B., 2001. "Growth and risk-sharing with private information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 499-521, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Aiyagari, S Rao, 1994. "Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Saving," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(3), pages 659-84, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Phelan Christopher, 1995. "Repeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 488-506, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Y. Jin & T. Temzelides, 1999. "On the Local Interaction of Money and Credit," Macroeconomics 9905001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. S. Rao Aiyagari & Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information," Working Paper 9807, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Marina Pavan, 2003. "Consumer Durables and Risky Borrowing: the Effects of Bankruptcy Protection," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 573, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 01 May 2005. [Downloadable!]
  4. Aubhik Khan & B. Ravikumar, 1998. "Growth and Risk-Sharing with Private Information," Macroeconomics 9802003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Ricardo Cavalcanti & Andres Erosa & Ted Temzelides, 1998. "Private Money and Reserve Management in a Random Matching Model," Macroeconomics 9803008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Ted Temzelides, 2006. "A dynamic model of settlement," Working Paper Series 604, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Young Sik Kim, 2003. "Money, Growth and Risk Sharing with Private Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(2), pages 276-299, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Payments Systems with Random Matching and Private Information," Game Theory and Information 9802004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 1996. "Money is memory," Staff Report 218, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. S. Rao Aiyagari & Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Money, Credit, and Allocation Under Complete Dynamic Contracts and Incomplete Markets," Game Theory and Information 9802003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Ed Nosal & Guillaume Rocheteau, 2006. "The economics of payments," Policy Discussion Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Feb. [Downloadable!]
  12. Stephen D. Williamson, 2002. "Private money and counterfeiting," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 37-57. [Downloadable!]
  13. Radim Bohacek, 2005. "Capital Accumulation in Private Information Economies," Topics in Macroeconomics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1172-1172. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Stephen Williamson, 2000. "The Research Agenda: Payment Systems and Private Money," EconomicDynamics Newsletter, Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(1), November. [Downloadable!]
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