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Abstract

We consider a random matching model without monetary exchange where agents have complete access to each others' histories. Exchange is motivated by risk sharing given random unobservable incomes. The key feature of this environment is that information is mobile across locations even while goods are not.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Iowa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 97-03.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uia:iowaec:97-03

Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Iowa, Department of Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, Iowa City, Iowa 52242
Phone: (319) 335-0829
Fax: (319) 335-1956
Web page: http://tippie.uiowa.edu/economics/
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Related research

Keywords: INFORMATION ; ECONOMIC MODELS;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation

References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

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1. Christopher Phelan & Robert M Townsend, 2010. "Computing Multi-Period, Information Constrained Optima," Levine's Working Paper Archive 117, David K. Levine.
   
   • Phelan, Christopher & Townsend, Robert M, 1991. "Computing Multi-period, Information-Constrained Optima," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(5), pages 853-81, October.
   • Phelan, C. & Townsend, R.M., 1990. "Computing Multiperiod, Information-Constrained Optima," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 90-13, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
2. Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 1998. "Money Is Memory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 232-251, August.
   
   • Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 1996. "Money is memory," Staff Report 218, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
3. Williamson, Steve & Wright, Randall, 1994. "Barter and Monetary Exchange under Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 104-23, March.
   
   • Williamson, S. & Wright, R., 1991. "Barter and Monetary Exchange Under Private Information," University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations Working Papers 9107, University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations.
   • Steve Williamson & Randall Wright, 1991. "Barter and monetary exchange under private information," Staff Report 141, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
4. Khan, A. & Ravikumar, B., 1997. "Growth and Risk-Sharing with Private Information," Working Papers 97-13, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
   
   • Khan, Aubhik & Ravikumar, B., 2001. "Growth and risk-sharing with private information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 499-521, June.
   • Aubhik Khan & B. Ravikumar, 1998. "Growth and Risk-Sharing with Private Information," Macroeconomics 9802003, EconWPA.
   • Aubhik Khan & B. Ravikumar, 1999. "Growth and risk-sharing with private information," Working Papers 99-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
5. Wang, Cheng, 1995. "Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets," Staff General Research Papers 5249, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
6. Wang, Cheng, 1995. "Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 577-95, October.
7. Andrew Atkeson & Robert E Lucas, 2010. "On Efficient Distribution with Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2179, David K. Levine.
   
   • Atkeson, Andrew & Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1992. "On Efficient Distribution with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 427-53, July.
8. Atkeson Andrew & Lucas Jr. , Robert E., 1995. "Efficiency and Equality in a Simple Model of Efficient Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 64-88, June.
9. S. Rao Aiyagari & Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information," Working Paper 9807, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
   
   • Aiyagari, S. Rao & Williamson, Stephen D., 2000. "Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 248-279, April.
   • Aiyagari, S. Rao & Williamson, Stephen, 1997. "Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information," Working Papers 97-19, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
   • S. Rao Aiyagari & Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information," Game Theory and Information 9802002, EconWPA.
10. Aubhik Khan & B. Ravikumar, 2002. "Enduring relationships in an economy with capital," Working Papers 02-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
11. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1989. "On Money as a Medium of Exchange," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 927-54, August.
12. Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1990. "Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 367-390, August.
13. Aiyagari, S Rao, 1994. "Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Saving," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(3), pages 659-84, August.
    
    • S. Rao Aiyagari, 1993. "Uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate saving," Working Papers 502, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
14. Aiyagari, S Rao & Wallace, Neil, 1991. "Existence of Steady States with Positive Consumption in the Kiyotaki-Wright Model," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(5), pages 901-16, October.
    
    • S. Rao Aiyagari & Neil Wallace, 1991. "Existence of steady states with positive consumption in the Kiyotaki-Wright model," Working Papers 428, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
15. Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Payments Systems with Random Matching and Private Information," Game Theory and Information 9802004, EconWPA.
    
    • Williamson, Stephen D, 1998. "Payments Systems with Random Matching and Private Information," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 551-69, August.
    • Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Payment systems with random matching and private information," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Aug, pages 551-572.
    • Williamson, Stephen, 1997. "Payments Systems with Random Matching and Private Information," Working Papers 97-21, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
16. Spear, Stephen E & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1987. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 599-617, October.
17. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1993. "A Search-Theoretic Approach to Monetary Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 63-77, March.
18. Townsend, Robert M, 1982. "Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1166-86, December.
19. Phelan Christopher, 1995. "Repeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 488-506, August.

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