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Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information

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Author Info
Aiyagari, S. Rao (University of Rochester)
Williamson, Stephen () (University of Iowa)

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Abstract

We construct a model with private information in which consumers write dynamic contracts with financial intermediaries. A role for money arises due to random limited participation of consumers in the financial market. Without defection constraints, a Friedman rule is optimal, the mean and variability of wealth tend to fall in the steady state, and the welfare effects of inflation are very small. With defection constraints, it is optimal to eliminate currency entirely, the variability of wealth tends to rise with inflation, and the welfare effects of inflation are large.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Iowa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 97-19.

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Length: 44 Pages
Date of creation: Oct 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uia:iowaec:97-19

Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Iowa, Department of Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, Iowa City, Iowa 52242
Phone: (319) 335-0829
Fax: (319) 335-1956
Web page: http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/econ/
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Related research
Keywords: Money Credit Private Information

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Lacker, Jeffrey M. & Schreft, Stacey L., 1996. "Money and credit as means of payment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 3-23, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Drew Fudenberg & Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, 1987. "Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships," Working papers 468, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  3. Harold L. Cole & Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 1999. "Efficient allocations with hidden income and hidden storage," Staff Report 238, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Allen, Franklin, 1985. "Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 27-31. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Townsend, Robert M, 1987. "Economic Organization with Limited Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 954-71, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Townsend, Robert M, 1989. "Currency and Credit in a Private Information Economy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1323-44, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Spear, Stephen E & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1987. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(4), pages 599-617, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Phelan, C. & Townsend, R.M., 1990. "Computing Multiperiod, Information-Constrained Optima," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 90-13, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
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  9. Atkeson, Andrew & Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1992. "On Efficient Distribution with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(3), pages 427-53, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Aiyagari, S.R. & Williamson, S.D., 1997. "Credit in a Random Matching Model with Private Information," Working Papers 97-03, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
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  11. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1992. "On Efficiency and Distribution," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(411), pages 233-47, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Taub, Bart, 1994. "Currency and Credit Are Equivalent Mechanisms," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(4), pages 921-56, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Fuerst, Timothy S., 1992. "Liquidity, loanable funds, and real activity," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 3-24, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1990. "Liquidity and interest rates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 237-264, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Narayana R. Kocherlakota & Neil Wallace, 1997. "Optimal allocations with incomplete record-keeping and no commitment," Working Papers 578, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  16. Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1990. "Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 367-390, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 1996. "Money is memory," Staff Report 218, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Aiyagari, S Rao, 1994. "Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Saving," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(3), pages 659-84, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Dotsey, Michael & Ireland, Peter, 1996. "The welfare cost of inflation in general equilibrium," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 29-47, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Phelan Christopher, 1995. "Repeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 488-506, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Edward J. Green, 2002. "Payment Arrangements and Inflation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 51-57, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Cyril Monnet & William Roberds, 2007. "Optimal pricing of payment services when cash is an alternative," Working Papers 07-26, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  3. Cyril Monnet & William Roberds, 2006. "Credit and the no-surcharge rule," Working Paper 2006-25, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
  4. Hongfei Sun, 2007. "Banking, Inside Money and Outside Money," Working Papers 1146, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Williamson, Stephen D. & Wang, Cheng, 1999. "Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance, and Experience Rating," Working Papers 99-03, University of Iowa, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. S. Rao Aiyagari & Stephen D. Williamson, 1999. "Credit in a Random Matching Model with Private Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(1), pages 36-64, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Charles Kahn & James McAndrews & William Roberds, 2001. "A Theory of Transactions Privacy," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 01-12, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Ted Temzelides, 2006. "A dynamic model of settlement," Working Paper Series 604, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Aleksander Berentsen & Cyril Monnet, 2008. "Monetary policy in a channel system," Working Papers 08-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Charles M. Kahn & James McAndrews & William Roberds, 2004. "Money is privacy," Working Paper 2004-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Charles M. Kahn & James McAndrews & William Roberds, 2005. "Money Is Privacy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(2), pages 377-399, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Ted Temzelides, 2007. "A dynamic model of the payment system," Working Papers 07-22, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  12. Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, 2005. "Credit and identity theft," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Young Sik Kim, 2003. "Money, Growth and Risk Sharing with Private Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(2), pages 276-299, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Payments Systems with Random Matching and Private Information," Game Theory and Information 9802004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. S. Rao Aiyagari & Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Money, Credit, and Allocation Under Complete Dynamic Contracts and Incomplete Markets," Game Theory and Information 9802003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Aleksander Berentsen & Gabriele Camera & Christopher Waller, . "Money, Credit and Banking," IEW - Working Papers iewwp219, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Ed Nosal & Guillaume Rocheteau, 2006. "The economics of payments," Policy Discussion Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Feb. [Downloadable!]
  18. Gaetano Antinolfi & Costas Azariadis & James B. Bullard, 2007. "The optimal inflation target in an economy with limited enforcement," Working Papers 2007-037, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
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