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Homo Moralis and regular altruists – preference evolution for when they disagree

Author

Listed:
  • Aslihan Akdeniz

    (University of Amsterdam)

  • Christopher Graser

    (University of Amsterdam)

  • Matthijs van Veelen

    (University of Amsterdam)

Abstract

Alger and Weibull (2013) present a model for the evolution of preferences under incomplete information and assortative matching. Their main result is that Homo Moralis – who maximizes a convex combination of her narrow self-interest and “the right thing to do” – is evolutionarily stable, if it assigns a weight on the right thing to do that is equal to the assortment parameter. We give a counterexample against their central result, and a way to repair it. We also show that the result ceases to hold if we allow for mixed equilibria or coordination on asymmetric equilibria. Allowing for mixed equilibria, we show that if there is a stable preference, it will be behaviorally equivalent to a regular altruist that puts a positive weight on the payoff of the other that is equal to the assortment parameter. We also consider the cross-species empirical evidence.

Suggested Citation

  • Aslihan Akdeniz & Christopher Graser & Matthijs van Veelen, 2020. "Homo Moralis and regular altruists – preference evolution for when they disagree," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 20-062/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20200062
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Matthijs Veelen & Peter Spreij, 2009. "Evolution in games with a continuous action space," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(3), pages 355-376, June.
    4. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
    5. Frank, Robert H, 1987. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 593-604, September.
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    7. Aylwyn Scally & Bryndis Yngvadottir & Yali Xue & Qasim Ayub & Richard Durbin & Chris Tyler-Smith, 2013. "A Genome-Wide Survey of Genetic Variation in Gorillas Using Reduced Representation Sequencing," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(6), pages 1-9, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Homo Moralis; altruism; preference evolution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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