Are Sunk Costs A Barrier To Entry?
AbstractThe received wisdom is that sunk costs create a barrier to entryâ if entry fails, then the entrant, unable to recover sunk costs, incurs greater losses. In a strategic context where an incumbent may prey on the entrant, sunk entry costs have a countervailing effect: they may effectively commit the entrant to stay in the market. By providing the entrant with commitment power, sunk investments may soften the reactions of incumbents. The net effect may imply that entry is more profitable when sunk costs are greater.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 06-09.
Date of creation: 2006
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- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-02-03 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2007-02-03 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENT-2007-02-03 (Entrepreneurship)
- NEP-IND-2007-02-03 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2007-02-03 (Microeconomics)
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