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Mixed oligopoly and the choice of capacity

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  • Lu, Yuanzhu
  • Poddar, Sougata

Abstract

We analyze the capacity choice of firms under different time structures in a mixed oligopoly market, in which firms decide not only production quantities but also capacity scales. We show that the public firm never chooses excess capacity, while the private firm never chooses under capacity under all possible strategic environments.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Research in Economics.

Volume (Year): 59 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 365-374

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Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:59:y:2005:i:4:p:365-374

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622941

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References

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  1. de Palma, André & Thisse, Jacques-François, 1995. "Privatization and Efficiency in a Differentiated Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers 1136, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Dixit, Avinash, 1980. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(357), pages 95-106, March.
  3. Bulow, Jeremy & Geanakoplos, John & Klemperer, Paul, 1985. "Holding Idle Capacity to Deter Entry [The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence]," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(377), pages 178-82, March.
  4. Cremer, H. & Marchand, M. & Thisse, J.-F., 1987. "The public firm as an instrument for regulating an oligopolistic market," CORE Discussion Papers 1987010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Basu, Kaushik & Singh, Nirvikar, 1990. "Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(1), pages 61-71, February.
  6. Roger Ware, 1986. "A Model of Public Enterprise with Entry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 19(4), pages 642-55, November.
  7. de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1990. " Game Theoretic Models of Mixed Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 1-17.
  8. Pal, Debashis, 1998. "Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 181-185, November.
  9. Vives, Xavier, 1986. "Commitment, flexibility and market outcomes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 217-229, June.
  10. Cremer, Helmuth, 1989. "The Public Firm As An Instrument for Regulating An Oligopolistic Market. Oxf. Econ. Pap.-New Ser," Open Access publications from Université catholique de Louvain info:hdl:2078.1/52724, Université catholique de Louvain.
  11. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2004:i:2:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Yasuo Sanjo, 2009. "Quality choice in a health care market: a mixed duopoly approach," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 207-215, May.
  2. Jorge Fernández-Ruiz, 2012. "Capacity choice in a mixed duopoly with a foreign competitor," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(3), pages 2653-2661.
  3. Yoshihiro Tomaru & Yasuhiko Nakamura & Masayuki Saito, 2009. "Capacity Choice in a Mixed Duopoly with Managerial Delegation," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(3), pages 1904-1924.
  4. John S. Heywood & Guangliang Ye, 2009. "Delegation in a mixed oligopoly: the case of multiple private firms," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(2), pages 71-82.
  5. Ingrid Kubin & Laura Gardini, 2012. " Border Collision Bifurcations in Boom and Bust Cycles," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp137, Vienna University of Economics, Department of Economics.
  6. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2006:i:14:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Meunier, Guy, 2008. "Strategic commitment in a mixed oligopoly," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 92-100, June.
  8. Juan Carlos Barcena-Ruiz & María Begoña Garzón, 2007. "Capacity Choice in a Mixed Duopoly under Price Competition," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(26), pages 1-7.
  9. Tishler, Asher & Milstein, Irena & Woo, Chi-Keung, 2008. "Capacity commitment and price volatility in a competitive electricity market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1625-1647, July.
  10. Yuanzhu Lu & Sougata Poddar, 2006. "Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly and Private Duopoly - ‘Capacity- then-Quantity’ Game," Departmental Working Papers wp0605, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics.
  11. Fabio Lamantia, 2011. "A Nonlinear Duopoly with Efficient Production-Capacity Levels," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 38(3), pages 295-309, October.

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