Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Network regulation using an agent

Contents:

Author Info

  • Jolian McHardy

    ()
    (Department of Economics, The University of Sheffield)

  • Michael Reynolds
  • Stephen Trotter

Abstract

The general complexity of demand interrelationships including the co-existence of complements and substitutes make traditional methods of regulating network industries problematic. Collusive pricing is preferred to independent pricing on complementary sections of a network whilst the reverse is true where goods/services are substitutes. However, the costs of market failure in the context of complementary goods, in particular, make appropriate regulatory involvement in such industries all the more important. In this paper, we explore alternative competitive and regulatory strategies within a simple theoretical network with differentiated demands. We show that the employment of an independent profit-maximising agent may offer a partial solution to the problem of network regulation, yielding outcomes which involve all parties pursuing their own interests yet being desirable to both firms and a welfare-maximising social planner.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.shef.ac.uk/content/1/c6/06/58/60/SERP2007004.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found (http://www.shef.ac.uk/content/1/c6/06/58/60/SERP2007004.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/content/1/c6/06/58/60/SERP2007004.pdf). If this is indeed the case, please notify (Georgios Efthyvoulou)
File Function: First version, 2007
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://www.shef.ac.uk/content/1/c6/06/58/60/SERP2007004.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found (http://www.shef.ac.uk/content/1/c6/06/58/60/SERP2007004.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/content/1/c6/06/58/60/SERP2007004.pdf). If this is indeed the case, please notify (Georgios Efthyvoulou)
File Function: Revised version, 2007
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2007004.

as in new window
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2007
Date of revision: Feb 2007
Handle: RePEc:shf:wpaper:2007004

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 9 Mappin Street, SHEFFIELD, S1 4DT
Phone: +44 114 222 3399
Fax: + 44 (0)114 222 3458
Email:
Web page: http://www.shef.ac.uk/economics
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Networks; Regulation; Duopoly; Agent;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Jolian Mchardy, 2006. "Complementary Monopoly And Welfare: Is Splitting Up So Bad?," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 74(3), pages 334-349, 06.
  2. Else, P. K. & James, T. J., 1995. "Privatisation and the quality of rail services," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 387-400, November.
  3. Economides, Nicholas & Salop, Steven C, 1992. "Competition and Integration among Complements, and Network Market Structure," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 105-23, March.
  4. McHardy, Jolian & Trotter, Stephen, 2006. "Competition and deregulation: Do air passengers get the benefits?," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 74-93, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:shf:wpaper:2007004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Georgios Efthyvoulou).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.