This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in Systems Markets

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Joseph Farrell (Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley)
Michael L. Katz (Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We consider innovation incentives in markets where final goods comprise two strictly complementary components, one of which is monopolized. We focus on the case in which the complementary component is competitively supplied, and in which innovation is important. We explore ways in which the monopoly may have incentives to confiscate efficiency rents in the competitive sector, thus weakening or destroying incentives for independent innovation. We discuss how these problems are affected if the monopolist integrates into the competitive sector.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/dev/papers/0303/0303005.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Development and Comp Systems with number 0303005.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 27 Mar 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0303005

Note: 39 pages, Adobe.pdf
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://129.3.20.41

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (EconWPA).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
O3 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Jay Pil Choi, 1995. "Preemptive R&D, Rent Dissipation and the "Leverage Theory"," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH.
    Other versions:
  2. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 1998. "The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries," NBER Working Papers 6831, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Economides, Nicholas & Salop, Steven C, 1992. "Competition and Integration among Complements, and Network Market Structure," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(1), pages 105-23, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Katz, Michael L., 1989. "Vertical contractual relations," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 655-721 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. A. Michael Spence, 1975. "Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 417-429, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Whinston, Michael D, 1990. "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 837-59, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Nicholas Economides & Evangelos Katsamakas, 2004. "Two-sided competition of proprietary vs. open source technology platforms and the implications for the software industry," Working Papers 04-22, NET Institute, revised Aug 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Luis Cabral & Ben Polak, 2007. "Dominant Firms, Imitation, and Incentives to Innovate," Working Papers 07-6, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Joseph Farrell, 2003. "Integration and Independent Innovation on a Network," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1053, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Keith M. Chen & Barry Nalebuff, 2006. "One-Way Essential Complements," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000669, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Luís Cabral & Ben Polak, 2004. "Does Microsoft Stifle Innovation? Dominant Firms, Imitation, and R&D Incentives," Working Papers 06, Portuguese Competition Authority. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Barry Nalebuff & David B. Yoffie, 2007. "Competing Complements," Working Papers 07-44, NET Institute, revised Nov 2007. [Downloadable!]
  7. Dennis W. Carlton & Joshua S. Gans & Michael Waldman, 2007. "Why Tie A Product Consumers Do Not Use?," NBER Working Papers 13339, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Boudreau, Kevin, 2006. "The Boundaries of the Platform: Vertical Integration and Economic Incentives in Mobile Computing," Working papers 30609, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  9. Steven J. Davis & Jack MacCrisken & Kevin M. Murphy, 2001. "Economic Perspectives on Software Design: PC Operating Systems and Platforms," NBER Working Papers 8411, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Aaron Edlin & Joseph Farrell, 2002. "The American Airlines Case: A Chance to Clarify Predation Policy," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1048, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Annabelle Gawer & Rebecca Henderson, 2005. "Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel," NBER Working Papers 11852, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Bijl, P.W.J. de & Peitz, M., 2007. "Innovation, Convergence and the Role of Regulation in the Netherlands," Discussion Paper 2007-016, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
  13. Andras Niedermayer, 2007. "On Platforms, Incomplete Contracts, and Open Source Software," Diskussionsschriften dp0707, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
  14. A. Banerji & Bhaskar Dutta, 2004. "Networks, Network Externalities and Market Segmentation," Working papers 124, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. REY, Patrick & SEABRIGHT, Paul & TIROLE, Jean, 2001. "The Activities of a Monopoly Firm in Adjacent Competitive Markets: Economic Consequences and Implications for Competition Policy," IDEI Working Papers 132, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2002. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc encourages publishers to make their bibliographic data freely available to the public.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-17.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.