On the Problem of Network Monopoly
AbstractWe introduce a new regulatory concept: the independent profit-maximising agent, as a model for regulating a network monopoly. The agent sets prices on cross-network goods taking either a complete, or arbitrarily small, share of the associated profit. We examine welfare and profits with and without each agent type under both network monopoly and network duopoly. We show that splitting up the network monopoly (creating network duopoly) may be inferior for both firm(s) and society compared with a network monopoly "regulated" by an agent and that society always prefers any of the four agent regimes over network monopoly and network duopoly.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2009003.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2009
Date of revision: Mar 2009
Network; Monopoly; Agent;
Other versions of this item:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government Pricing and Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-06-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-06-03 (Business Economics)
- NEP-ENE-2009-06-03 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-IND-2009-06-03 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2009-06-03 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2009-06-03 (Network Economics)
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