Alliance Partner Choice in Markets with Vertical and Horizontal Externalities
AbstractThis study investigates the choice between complementary and parallel alliances in a market with vertical and horizontal externalities. One composite goods firm competes with two components producers, each providing a complementary component of a differentiated com- posite good. Although the joint profits from a parallel alliance between the composite goods firm and a components producer are always larger than those from a complementary alliance between components producers, through Nash bargaining, a components producer prefers the complementary (parallel) alliance when the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently large (small). Combined with the result that a complementary alliance is socially preferable, our findings provide meaningful implications for antitrust policy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 25732.
Date of creation: 08 Oct 2010
Date of revision:
Complementary alliance; Parallel alliance; Nash bargaining; Antitrust policy;
Other versions of this item:
- Hattori Keisuke & Lin Ming-Hsin, 2011. "Alliance Partner Choice in Markets with Vertical and Horizontal Externalities," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-27, June.
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2010-10-23 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2010-10-23 (Microeconomics)
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