Who Contributes? A Strategic Approach to a European Immigration Policy
AbstractAccording to the Lisbon Treaty the increasing cost of enforcing the European border against immigration shall be shared among the EU members. Nonetheless, the Treaty is rather vague with respect to the "appropriate measures" to adopt in order to distribute the financial burden. Members who do not share their borders with source countries have an incentive to free ride on the other countries. We study a contribution game where a border country and a central country minimize a loss function with respect to their national immigration target. We consider both sequential and simultaneous decisions and we show that joint contribution occurs only if the immigration targets are not too different. Total contribution is higher when decisions are simultaneous, but the sequential framework achieves joint contribution under a wider difference in the national targets.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy in its series CSEF Working Papers with number 306.
Date of creation: 08 Feb 2012
Date of revision:
Policy making; Government expenditures; Local government expenditures; Federalism.;
Other versions of this item:
- Giuseppe Russo & Luigi Senatore, 2013. "Who contributes? A strategic approach to a European immigration policy," IZA Journal of Migration, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 1-16, December.
- Russo, Giuseppe & Senatore, Luigi, 2011. "Who Contributes? A Strategic Approach to a European Immigration Policy," MPRA Paper 33421, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2012-02-27 (European Economics)
- NEP-EUR-2012-02-27 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-MIG-2012-02-27 (Economics of Human Migration)
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