Vertical Separation with Private Contracts
AbstractWe consider a manufacturer's incentive to sell through an independent retailer, rather than directly to final consumers, when contracts with retailers cannot be observed by competitors. If retailers conjecture that identical competing manufacturers always offer identical contracts (symmetry beliefs), vertical separation by all manufacturers is an equilibrium, and it results in higher consumers' prices and manufacturers' profits. Even with private contracts, vertically separated manufacturers reduce competition by inducing less aggressive behaviour by retailers in the final market. We characterize a condition for manufacturers' profits to be higher with private than with public contracts. Our results hold both with price and with quantity competition, and do not hinge on retailers' beliefs being perfectly symmetric.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy in its series CSEF Working Papers with number 251.
Date of creation: 26 Apr 2010
Date of revision: 09 Jul 2011
Publication status: Published in Economic Journal, 2012, Vol. 122, 173-207.
Delegation; vertical separation; private contracts; symmetry beliefs;
Other versions of this item:
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2010-05-08 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2010-05-08 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2010-05-08 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2010-05-08 (Microeconomics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Kopel, Michael & Brand, Björn, 2012. "Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 982-989.
- Piccolo, Salvatore & Pagnozzi, Marco, 2013.
"Information sharing between vertical hierarchies,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 201-222.
- Jon X. Eguia & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Rebecca Morton & Antonio Nicolò, 2014.
"Equilibrium Selection in Sequential Games with Imperfect Information,"
717, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Jon X. Eguia & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Rebecca Morton & Antonio Nicolò, 2014. "Equilibrium Selection in Sequential Games with Imperfect Information," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_04, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lia Ambrosio).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.