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An Egg Today and a Chicken Tomorrow: A Model of Social Security with Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting

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Abstract

Strotz (1956) first suggested that individuals are more impatient when making short-run tradeoffs than long-run ones. Many experimental studies supports his conjecture. Motivated by recent evidence from the British Department of Work and Pension (2006), this paper applies this behavioral framework to retirement decisions. We propose a three-periods OLG model with quasi-hyperbolic consumers whosave for post retirement consumption in the first period and choose their retirement age in the second. We show that this behavioral assumption explains the observed drop in post retirement consumptiondue to lack of saving and the high level of voluntary (i.e. not due to disability or dismission from the firm) early exit from the labor force. When deciding about their retirement age, workers weight too much the costs of remaining at work (i.e. disutility of working, implicit tax on continued activity) and too little the benefits of postponed retirement (i.e. increase of the Bismarckian component of the pension formula), perceived as too far in the future. We investigate the implications of time inconsistent preferences for a political economy model in which voters determine simultaneously thesize and the degree of redistribution of the pension system. We show that, when voting over thepayroll tax, time inconsistent young workers, who look for a commitment device that increases boththeir saving and retirement age, form a coalition with rich in order to decrease the size of the system. When voting over the degree of redistribution, they form a coalition with poor individuals as to in-crease the at part of the pension formula. Our political model provides a political justification for the negative relationship between size and redistribution observed in most OECD countries (Disney 2004).

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy in its series CSEF Working Papers with number 205.

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Date of creation: 26 Sep 2008
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Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:205

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Keywords: Hyperbolic Discounting; Majority Voting; Redistribution; Retirement Age; Saving Behaviour;

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References

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  1. CREMER, Helmuth & DE DONDER, Philippe & MALDONADO, Dario & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2006. "Designing a linear pension scheme with forced savings and wage heterogeneity," CORE Discussion Papers 2006047, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Jan Hagemejer & Krzysztof Makarski & Joanna Tyrowicz, 2013. "Efficiency of the pension reform: the welfare effects of various fiscal closures," Working Papers 2013-23, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
  2. Marcin Bielecki & Karolina Goraus & Jan Hagemejer & Joanna Tyrowicz, 2014. "The Sooner The Better - The Welfare Effects of the Retirement Age Increase Under Various Pension Schemes," Working Papers 2014-12, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
  3. Markus Haavio & Kaisa Kotakorpi, 2009. "The Political Economy of Sin Taxes," CESifo Working Paper Series 2650, CESifo Group Munich.

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