It is often argued that implicit taxation on continued activity of elderly workers is responsible for the widely observed trend towards early retirement. In a world of laissez-faire or of first-best efficiency, there would be no such implicit taxation. The point of this paper is that when first-best redistributive instruments are not available, because some variables are not observable, the optimal policy does imply a distortion of the retirement decision. Consequently, the inducement of early retirement may be part of the optimal tax-transfer policy. We consider a model in which individuals differ in their productivity and their capacity to work long and choose both their weekly labor supply and their age of retirement. We characterize the optimal non linear tax-transfer that maximizes a utilitarian welfare function when weekly earnings and the length of active life are observable while individuals' productivity and health status are not observable.
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number
CESifo Working Paper No. 693.
Find related papers by JEL classification: E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
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CREMER, Helmuth & LOZACHMEUR, Jean-Marie & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2004.
"Disability Testing and Retirement,"
IDEI Working Papers
281, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Vincenzo Galasso & Paola Profeta, 2005.
"The Evolution of Retirement,"
Working Papers
278, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
CREMER, Helmuth & LOZACHMEUR, Jean-Marie & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2006.
"Disability testing and retirement,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2006016, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!]