Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Optimal redistribution with heterogeneous preferences for leisure

Contents:

Author Info

  • BOADWAY, R.
  • MARCHAND, M.
  • PESTIEAU, P.
  • del MAR RACIONERO, M.

Abstract

This paper examines the properties of the optimal nonlinear income tax when preferences are quasilinear in leisure and heterogeneous. Individuals differ in their ability and in their preferences for leisure. The government seeks to redistribute income. It can perfectly observe the level of endogenous income but cannot observe either ability or preferences. Theheterogeneity of preferences leads to problems of comparability between individual utilities which challenge the design of redistributive schemes. In particular, we analyze the consequences of adopting a utilitarian socialwelfare function where the government is allowed to give different weights to individuals wih different preferences. Under this particular social objective and given the quasilinearity of preferences, we are able to obtain closed-form solutions for the marginal tax rates and to examine the progressivity of the tax system according to the weights used.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://alfresco.uclouvain.be/alfresco/download/attach/workspace/SpacesStore/6a0f108b-e7e1-49b4-8897-4301647a21c9/coredp_2001_25.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2001025.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 00 May 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2001025

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Phone: 32(10)474321
Fax: +32 10474304
Email:
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: optimal income taxation; quasi-linear preferences; asymmetric information;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Katherine Cuff, 2000. "Optimality of workfare with heterogeneous preferences," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(1), pages 149-174, February.
  2. BOADWAY, Robin & CUFF, Katherine & MARCHAND, Maurice, . "Optimal income taxation with quasi-linear preferences revisited," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1466, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. M. Fleurbaey & F. Maniquet, 1999. "Optimal income taxation : An ordinal approach," THEMA Working Papers 99-43, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  4. Lollivier, Stefan & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1983. "Bunching and second-order conditions: A note on optimal tax theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 392-400, December.
  5. Weymark, John A, 1987. "Comparative Static Properties of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1165-85, September.
  6. repec:fth:louvco:9865 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Weymark, John A., 1986. "A reduced-form optimal nonlinear income tax problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 199-217, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2001025. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.