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Tax Policy and Labor Market Performance

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  • Lans Bovenberg

Abstract

In exploring the impact of tax policy on labor-market performance, the paper first investigates how tax reform impacts labor supply and equilibrium unemployment in representative agent models. The impact of tax policy on labor market performance depends importantly on various other labor-market institutions, such as minimum wage laws, wage bargaining, and unemployment benefits. In non-competitive labor markets, employment declines if a higher tax burden makes the outside option (i.e. unemployment) relatively more attractive. Marginal tax rates typically differ substantially across individuals. To explore the impact of specific tax policies, therefore, the paper relies on an applied general equilibrium model to investigate the consequences of tax reform with heterogeneous households. The model simulations reveal several trade-offs between various objectives, such as cutting unemployment, stimulating the participation of secondary workers into the labor force, raising the quality and quantity of labor supply, and establishing an equitable income distribution. The paper also analyses how efficiency considerations affect the optimal progressiveness of labor income taxes. Finally, the optimal progression of the labor income tax is investigated in the presence of search unemployment, heterogeneous households and distributional concerns.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1035.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1035

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Frederick van der Ploeg, 2004. "The Welfare State, Redistribution and the Economy, Reciprocal Altruism, Consumer Rivalry and Second Best," CESifo Working Paper Series 1234, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Holmlund, Bertil & Söderström, Martin, 2007. "Estimating Income Responses to Tax Changes: A Dynamic Panel Data Approach," IZA Discussion Papers 3088, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Florian Baumann & Nikolai Stähler, 2006. "Financing Unemployment Benefits: Dismissal versus Employment Taxes," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 20(3), pages 433-451, 09.
  4. Peichl, Andreas, 2005. "Die Evaluation von Steuerreformen durch Simulationsmodelle," FiFo Discussion Papers - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 05-1, University of Cologne, FiFo Institute for Public Economics.
  5. Michael T. Feil, 2006. "Funding public health care: A flat-rate premium might be bad for employment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(3), pages 1-10.

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