Is It Legitimate to Encourage Work Sharing?
Abstract
A generalization of J. A. Mirrlees's (1971) income taxation model is formulated in which qualifications of workers are both endogenous and observable by the government. Individuals differ by their unobservable abilities, which simultaneously affect their disutility of labor and their cost of training. In general, the optimal tax schedule depends not only on income but also on its 'components,' i.e., wage rate (or qualification) and labor supply. The authors find conditions under which it is optimal to subsidize lower qualifications or to encourage work sharing. Copyright 1995 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 97 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 621-33
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Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442
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Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Maderner, N. & Rochet, J.C., 1996. "Is It Legitimate to Encourage Work Sharing?," Papers 96.404, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General
- J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
- J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Paul Beaudry & Charles Blackorby & Dezs� Szalay, 2009.
"Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 216-42, March.
- Beaudry, P. & Blackorby, C., 1997. "Taxes en Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs," UBC Departmental Archives 97-21, UBC Department of Economics.
- Paul Beaudry & Charles Blackorby, 1998. "Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs," NBER Working Papers 6355, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Beaudry, Paul & Blackorby, Charles, 2004. "Taxes And Employment Subsidies In Optimal Redistribution Programs," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 708, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Beaudry, Paul & Blackorby, Charles, 2006. "Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 766, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Robert Moffitt, 2006.
"Welfare Work Requirements with Paternalistic Government Preferences,"
NBER Working Papers
12366, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert Moffitt, 2006. "Welfare work Requirements with Paternalistic Government Preferences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(515), pages F441-F458, November.
- Robert Moffitt, 2005. "Welfare Work Requirements with Paternalistic Government Preferences," Economics Working Paper Archive 534, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Jun 2006.
- Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Pestieau, Pierre, 2004.
"Social Security, Retirement Age and Optimal Income Taxation,"
Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole
http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
- Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Pestieau, Pierre, 2004. "Social security, retirement age and optimal income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(11), pages 2259-2281, September.
- Helmuth Cremer & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur & Pierre Pestieau, 2002. "Social Security, Retirement Age and Optimal Income Taxation," CESifo Working Paper Series 693, CESifo Group Munich.
- Darío Maldonado, 2008. "Education policies and optimal taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 131-143, April.
- Beaudry, Paul & Blackorby, Charles & Szalay, Dezso, 2006. "Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs (Revised Version)," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 779, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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