Voting over type and generosity of a pension system when some individuals are myopic

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Voting over type and generosity of a pension system when some individuals are myopic

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Cremer, Helmuth
De Donder, Philippe
Maldonado, Dario
Pestieau, Pierre

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 91 (2007)
Issue (Month): 10 (November)
Pages: 2041-2061
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:91:y:2007:i:10:p:2041-2061

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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Paper
- CREMER, Helmuth & DE DONDER, Philippe & MALDONADO, Dario & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2006. "Voting over type and generosity of a pension system when some individuals are myopic," CORE Discussion Papers 2006079, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
- Cremer, Helmuth & De Donder, Philippe & Maldonado, Darío & Pestieau, Pierre, 2006. "Voting Over Type and Generosity of a Pension System When Some Individuals are Myopic," CEPR Discussion Papers 5923, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Feldstein, Martin S, 1985. "The Optimal Level of Social Security Benefits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(2), pages 303-20, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Martin Feldstein, 1986. "The Optimal Level of Social Security Benefits," NBER Working Papers 0970, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Peter Diamond, 2004. "Social Security," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 1-24, March. [Downloadable!]
Michele Boldrin & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "Political Equilibria with Social Security," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(1), pages 41-78, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Benabou, R. & Tirole, J., 2001. "Willpower and Personal Rules," Papers 216, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
Other versions:
- Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2002. "Willpower and Personal Rules," CEPR Discussion Papers 3143, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Roland Benabou and Jean Tirole, 2004. "Willpower and Personal Rules," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(4), pages 848-886, August.
Assar Lindbeck & Mats Persson, 2003. "The Gains from Pension Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 74-112, March.
Other versions:
- Lindbeck, Assar & Persson, Mats, 2002. "The Gains from Pension Reform," Seminar Papers 712, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
- Lindbeck, Assar & Persson, Mats, 2002. "The Gains from Pension Reform," Working Paper Series 580, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Helmuth Cremer & Philippe de Donder & Darío Maldonado & Pierre Pestieau, 2008. "Forced Saving, Redistribution and Nonlinear Social Security Schemes," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Cremer, Helmuth & De Donder, Philippe & Maldonado, Darío & Pestieau, Pierre, 2008. "Forced Saving, Redistribution and Nonlinear Social Security Schemes," CEPR Discussion Papers 6775, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- CREMER, Helmuth & DE DONDER, Philippe & MALDONADO, Dario & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2008. "Forced saving, redistribution and nonlinear social security schemes," CORE Discussion Papers 2008020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
Matteo Bassi, 2008. "An Egg Today and a Chicken Tomorrow: A Model of Social Security with Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting," CSEF Working Papers 205, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
Markus Haavio & Kaisa Ilona Kotakorpi, 2009. "The Political Economy of Sin Taxes," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Song, Zheng, 2008. "The Dynamics of Inequality and Social Security in General Equilibrium," MPRA Paper 10365, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

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