A Coalition Game of the Baltic Sea Cod Fishery
AbstractThe paper sets up a discrete-time, deterministic, coalition game model among the major agents exploiting the cod stock in Baltic Sea. The characteristic func-tion is constructed and the Shapley value and the nucleolus are used as one-point solution concepts. The paper identifies the problem with these sharing rules and develops a new sharing rule which takes into account the stability of cooperation. The paper contributes to the literature by introducing a connection between cooperative games (sharing rules) and non-cooperative games (stabil-ity).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics in its series Working Papers with number 55/04.
Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2004
Date of revision:
Fisheries; Cooperation; Coalition Game; Baltic Sea Cod; Shapley value; Characteristic function; nucleolus; Sharing rules; stability of cooperation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
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- Lone Grønbæk Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2003.
"An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities forming Coalitions,"
50/03, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
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- Arnason, Ragnar & Magnusson, Gylfi & Agnarsson, Sveinn, 2000. "The Norwegian Spring-Spawning Herring Fishery: A Stylized Game Model," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 15(4).
- Hannesson, Rognvaldur, 1997. "Fishing as a Supergame," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 309-322, March.
- Lindroos, Marko & Kaitala, Veijo, 2000. "Nash Equilibria In A Coalition Game Of The Norwegian Spring-Spawning Herring Fishery," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 15(4).
- Duarte, Clara Costa & Brasao, Ana & Pintassilgo, Pedro, 2000. "Management Of The Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna: An Application Of C-Games," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 15(1).
- Brasao, Ana & Duarte, Clara Costa & Cunha-e-Sa, Maria A., 2000. "Managing The Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fisheries: The Stability Of The Un Fish Stock Agreement Solution," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 15(4).
- Kronbak, Lone Gronbaek & Lindroos, Marko, 2007. "Sharing Rules and Stability in Coalition Games with Externalities," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 22(2).
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