Sustainable coalitions in the commons
AbstractIt is well known that the non-cooperation among agents harvesting a renewable resource is critical for its sustainable management. The present paper gives insights on the complex balance between coalitions structure, resource state or dynamics and agents’ heterogeneity to avoid bio-economic collapses. A model bringing together coalition games and a viability approach is proposed to focus on the compatibility between bio-economic constraints and an exploited common stock dynamics. It is examined to what extent cooperation promotes sustainability. Based on the Shapley value, a measure of the marginal contribution of the users to the sustainability of the resource is proposed. It suggests that the stability of the grand coalition occurs for large enough stocks. By contrast, for lower levels of resource, the most efficient user plays the role of a dictator.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée in its series Cahiers du GREThA with number 2009-15.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Avenue Léon Duguit, 33608 Pessac Cedex
Phone: +33 (0)18.104.22.168.75
Fax: +33 (0)22.214.171.124.47
Web page: http://gretha.u-bordeaux4.fr/
More information through EDIRC
Renewable resource; dynamic game; coalition; maxmin strategy; shapley value; viability kernel;
Other versions of this item:
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-12-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2009-12-11 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2009-12-11 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-12-11 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- repec:ags:mareec:28204 is not listed on IDEAS
- John C. V. Pezzey, 1997. "Sustainability Constraints versus "Optimality" versus Intertemporal Concern, and Axioms versus Data," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 73(4), pages 448-466.
- Hannesson, Rognvaldur, 1997. "Fishing as a Supergame," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 309-322, March.
- Cardaliaguet, Pierre & Quincampoix, Marc & Saint-Pierre, Patrick, 2007. "Differential games through viability theory : old and recent results," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/5561, Paris Dauphine University.
- Stefan Baumgärtner & Martin F. Quaas, 2007.
"Ecological-economic viability as a criterion of strong sustainability under uncertainty,"
Working Paper Series in Economics
67, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
- Baumgärtner, Stefan & Quaas, Martin F., 2009. "Ecological-economic viability as a criterion of strong sustainability under uncertainty," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(7), pages 2008-2020, May.
- Béné, C. & Doyen, L., 2008. "Contribution values of biodiversity to ecosystem performances: A viability perspective," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1-2), pages 14-23, December.
- Burton, P.S., 2001.
"Community Enforcement of Fisheries Effort Restrictions,"
Department of Economics at Dalhousie University working papers archive
2001-01, Dalhousie, Department of Economics.
- Burton, Peter S., 2003. "Community enforcement of fisheries effort restrictions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(2, Supple), pages 474-491, March.
- Sandal, Leif K. & Steinshamn, Stein I., 2004. "Dynamic Cournot-competitive harvesting of a common pool resource," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 1781-1799, July.
- Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
- Bene, C. & Doyen, L. & Gabay, D., 2001. "A viability analysis for a bio-economic model," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 385-396, March.
- repec:ags:mareec:42448 is not listed on IDEAS
- Pedro Pintassilgo & Marko Lindroos, 2008. "Coalition Formation In Straddling Stock Fisheries: A Partition Function Approach," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(03), pages 303-317.
- Martinet, Vincent & Thebaud, Olivier & Doyen, Luc, 2007. "Defining viable recovery paths toward sustainable fisheries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 411-422, December.
- Jean-Christophe PEREAU (GREThA, UMR CNRS 5113) & Luc DOYEN (CNRS-MNHN, CNRS, UMR 7204) & Rich LITTLE (CSIRO Marine and Atmospheric Research) & Olivier THEBAUD (CSIRO Marine and Atmospheric Research), 2011.
"The triple bottom line: Meeting ecological, economic and social goals with Individual Transferable Quotas,"
Cahiers du GREThA
2011-01, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.
- Péreau, J.-C. & Doyen, L. & Little, L.R. & Thébaud, O., 2012. "The triple bottom line: Meeting ecological, economic and social goals with individual transferable quotas," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 419-434.
- Doyen, L. & Martinet, V., 2012.
"Maximin, viability and sustainability,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 1414-1430.
- L. Doyen & A. Cissé & S. Gourguet & L. Mouysset & P.-Y. Hardy & C. Béné & F. Blanchard & F. Jiguet & J.-C. Pereau & O. Thébaud, 2013. "Ecological-economic modelling for the sustainable management of biodiversity," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 353-364, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Vincent Frigant).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.