Sustainable coalitions in the commons
AbstractIt is well known that the non-cooperation among agents harvesting a renewable resource is critical for its sustainable management. The present paper gives insights on the complex balance between coalitions structure, resource state or dynamics and agents’ heterogeneity to avoid bio-economic collapses. A model bringing together coalition games and a viability approach is proposed to focus on the compatibility between bio-economic constraints and an exploited common stock dynamics. It is examined to what extent cooperation promotes sustainability. Based on the Shapley value, a measure of the marginal contribution of the users to the sustainability of the resource is proposed. It suggests that the stability of the grand coalition occurs for large enough stocks. By contrast, for lower levels of resource, the most efficient user plays the role of a dictator.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée in its series Cahiers du GREThA with number 2009-15.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Avenue Léon Duguit, 33608 Pessac Cedex
Phone: +33 (0)126.96.36.199.75
Fax: +33 (0)188.8.131.52.47
Web page: http://gretha.u-bordeaux4.fr/
More information through EDIRC
Renewable resource; dynamic game; coalition; maxmin strategy; shapley value; viability kernel;
Other versions of this item:
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-12-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2009-12-11 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2009-12-11 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-12-11 (Game Theory)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Péreau, J.-C. & Doyen, L. & Little, L.R. & Thébaud, O., 2012.
"The triple bottom line: Meeting ecological, economic and social goals with individual transferable quotas,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 419-434.
- Jean-Christophe PEREAU (GREThA, UMR CNRS 5113) & Luc DOYEN (CNRS-MNHN, CNRS, UMR 7204) & Rich LITTLE (CSIRO Marine and Atmospheric Research) & Olivier THEBAUD (CSIRO Marine and Atmospheric Research), 2011. "The triple bottom line: Meeting ecological, economic and social goals with Individual Transferable Quotas," Cahiers du GREThA 2011-01, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.
- Vincent Martinet & Luc Doyen, 2010.
"Maximin, Viability and Sustainability,"
EconomiX Working Papers
2010-19, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Vincent Frigant).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.