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Simulating the Ecology of Oligopoly Games with Genetic Algorithms

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Author Info
Chih-Chi Ni () (National Chengchi University)
Shu-Heng Chen () (National Chengchi University)
Abstract

This paper extends the N -person IPD game into a more interesting one in economics: the oligopoly game. Due to its dynamics of market share, the oligopoly game is more complicated and need not be exactly an N -person IPD game. Using genetic algorithms, we simulate oligopoly games under various settings. It is found that, even in the case of the three-oligopolist (three-player) game, collusive pricing (cooperation) is not the most dominating result.

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Paper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 1999 with number 1012.

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Date of creation: 01 Mar 1999
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Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf9:1012

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  1. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1986. "Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 251-269, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. David F. Midgley & Robert E. Marks & Lee G. Cooper, 1995. "Breeding Competitive Strategies," Working Papers 95-06-052, Santa Fe Institute.
  3. Shapiro, Carl, 1989. "Theories of oligopoly behavior," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 329-414 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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