IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/rff/dpaper/dp-09-08-efd.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Optimal Enforcement and Practical Issues of Resource Protection in Developing Countries

Author

Listed:
  • Robinson, Elizabeth J.Z.
  • Kumar, Ajay Mahaputra
  • Albers, Heidi J.

Abstract

This paper relates the key findings of the optimal economic enforcement literature to practical issues of enforcing and managing forest and wildlife access restrictions in developing countries. Our experiences, particularly in Tanzania and southern India, detail the major pragmatic issues facing those responsible for protecting natural resources. We identified large gaps in the theoretical literature that limit its ability to inform practical management, including issues of limited funding and cost recovery, multiple layers of enforcement, different incentives faced by those responsible for enforcement, and conflict between protected-area managers’ job requirements and rural people’s needs.

Suggested Citation

  • Robinson, Elizabeth J.Z. & Kumar, Ajay Mahaputra & Albers, Heidi J., 2009. "Optimal Enforcement and Practical Issues of Resource Protection in Developing Countries," RFF Working Paper Series dp-09-08-efd, Resources for the Future.
    • Handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-09-08-efd
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.rff.org/RFF/documents/EfD-DP-09-08.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Clarke, Harry R. & Reed, William J. & Shrestha, Ram M., 1993. "Optimal enforcement of property rights on developing country forests subject to illegal logging," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 271-293, September.
    2. Albers, Heidi J. & Robinson, Elizabeth J.Z., 2007. "Spatial-temporal aspects of cost-benefit analysis for park management: An example from Khao Yai National Park, Thailand," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 129-150, August.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Niv (Burnovski), Moshe Bar & Safra, Zvi, 2002. "On the social desirability of wealth-dependent fine policies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 53-59, July.
    6. Lear, Kelly Kristen & Maxwell, John W, 1998. "The Impact of Industry Structure and Penalty Policies on Incentives for Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 127-148, September.
    7. Arun S. Malik, 1990. "Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(3), pages 341-353, Autumn.
    8. Rodriguez-Ibeas, Roberto, 2002. "Regulatory Enforcement with Discretionary Fining and Litigation," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 105-118, April.
    9. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1994. "Marginal Deterrence in Enforcement of Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 1039-1066, October.
    10. Elizabeth J. Z. Robinson & Heidi J. Albers, 2006. "Parks, Buffer Zones, and Costly Enforcement," CSAE Working Paper Series 2006-15, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    11. Cavendish, William, 2000. "Empirical Regularities in the Poverty-Environment Relationship of Rural Households: Evidence from Zimbabwe," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(11), pages 1979-2003, November.
    12. Elizabeth J. Z. Robinson & Jeffrey C. Williams & Heidi J. Albers, 2002. "The Influence of Markets and Policy on Spatial Patterns of Non-Timber Forest Product Extraction," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 78(2), pages 260-271.
    13. Smith, Martin D. & Wilen, James E., 2003. "Economic impacts of marine reserves: the importance of spatial behavior," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 183-206, September.
    14. Helsley, Robert W. & Strange, William C., 1994. "Exclusion and the private enforcement of property rights," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 291-308, February.
    15. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1974. "The Private Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 0062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. "A note on private enforcement and type-I error," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 423-429, September.
    17. Friedman, David & Sjostrom, William, 1993. "Hanged for a Sheep--The Economics of Marginal Deterrence," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 345-366, June.
    18. Milliman, Scott R., 1986. "Optimal fishery management in the presence of illegal activity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 363-381, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Albers, H.J., 2010. "Spatial modeling of extraction and enforcement in developing country protected areas," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 165-179, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Elizabeth J. Z. Robinson, 2004. "Wanted dead and alive: Are hunting and protection of endangered species compatible?," CSAE Working Paper Series 2004-20, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    2. Louis Hotte, 2005. "Natural-resource exploitation with costly enforcement of property rights," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 497-521, July.
    3. Marcel Boyer & Tracy R. Lewis & Wei Lin Liu, 2000. "Setting standards for credible compliance and law enforcement," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(2), pages 319-340, May.
    4. Nøstbakken, Linda, 2008. "Fisheries law enforcement--A survey of the economic literature," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 293-300, May.
    5. Crinò, Rosario & Immordino, Giovanni & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2019. "Marginal deterrence at work," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 586-612.
    6. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2007. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 403-454, Elsevier.
    7. Eide, Erling & Rubin, Paul H. & Shepherd, Joanna M., 2006. "Economics of Crime," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 205-279, December.
    8. Rosario Crinó & Giovanni Immordino & Salvatore Piccolo, 2021. "Criminal mobility, fugitives, and extradition rules," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(1), pages 69-104, February.
    9. Thomas J. Miceli, 2018. "On proportionality of punishments and the economic theory of crime," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 303-314, December.
    10. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
    11. Anna Rita Germani, 2007. "The Environmental Enforcement in the Civil and the Common Law Systems. A Case on the Economic Effects of Legal Institutions," Quaderni DSEMS 22-2007, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.
    12. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2009. "Public Enforcement of Law," Chapters, in: Nuno Garoupa (ed.), Criminal Law and Economics, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. Ferrer, Rosa, 2010. "Breaking the law when others do: A model of law enforcement with neighborhood externalities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 163-180, February.
    14. Laurent Franckx, 2004. "Marginal Deterrence Through Ambient Environmental Inspections," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 51(4), pages 507-527, September.
    15. Alessandro Marra & Alessandro Sarra, 2010. "Incomplete antitrust laws and private actions for damages," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 111-135, October.
    16. Jensen, Sissel & Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E. & Sorgard, Lars, 2013. "Crime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 4/2013, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
    17. Kantorowicz-Reznichenko Elena, 2015. "Day-Fines: Should the Rich Pay More?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 481-501, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    optimal enforcement; protected-area management; non-timber forest products; conflict; India;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry
    • Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-09-08-efd. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Resources for the Future (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/rffffus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.