Regulatory Enforcement with Discretionary Fining and Litigation
AbstractIn this paper, we focus on the determination of the optimal fine set by a regulator when a firm can litigate to avoid paying the fine and the monitoring agency has discretionary power to negotiate with the firm the size of the fine. The regulator needs to balance the positive effect of the fine's size on the degree of non-compliance and the possibility of litigation if the fine is too high. We find that the optimal fine is not necessarily set at its maximum level. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Bulletin of Economic Research.
Volume (Year): 54 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0307-3378
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- Elizabeth Robinson, 2004.
"Wanted dead and alive: Are hunting and protection of endangered species compatible?,"
Development and Comp Systems
- Elizabeth J. Z. Robinson, 2004. "Wanted dead and alive: Are hunting and protection of endangered species compatible?," CSAE Working Paper Series 2004-20, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- Elizabeth Robinson, 2004. "Wanted dead and alive: Are hunting and protection of endangered species compatible?," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2004-20, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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