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Drafting Implementing Regulations for International Anti-Corruption Conventions

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Bryane Michael (Linacre College)
Abstract

How can executive agencies in developing countries implement international conventions against corruption? This paper looks at the legal issues presented by the Council of Europe, United Nations and OECD conventions against corruption; as well as the choices which executive agencies (such as the tax police, customs and border guard) in developing countries have in helping to implement these conventions. This paper reviews the potential obligations which these Conventions impose on executive agencies and the legal principles which should be enshired in executive regulation which translates these conventions into practice. This paper provides a simple legal/administrative test for corruption as well as tests for complicity, respondeat superiour, and tests which help establish jurisdiction between departments and between countries (in international corruption cases). The paper also discusses mechanisms for financing anti-corruption work, the conduct of tests or probes of civil servant bribe-taking behaviour, and the optimal fine to apply to businesses engaging in corruption as determined under a civil law standard

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File URL: http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/RePEc/qeh/qehwps/qehwps150.pdf
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Paper provided by Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford in its series QEH Working Papers with number qehwps150.

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Handle: RePEc:qeh:qehwps:qehwps150

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  1. Abraham L. Wickelgren, 2003. "Justifying Imprisonment: On the Optimality of Excessively Costly Punishment," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 377-411, August.
  2. Robert Cooter & Nuno Garoupa, 2000. "The Virtuous Circle of Distrust: A Mechanism to Deter Bribes and Other Cooperative Crimes," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1057, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Hay, Jonathan R & Shleifer, Andrei, 1998. "Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 398-403, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Abbott, Kenneth W & Snidal, Duncan, 2002. "Values and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight against Corruption," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages S141-78, January.
  5. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2001. "Corruption and optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Hatzis, Aristides N., 2002. "Having the cake and eating it too: efficient penalty clauses in Common and Civil contract law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 381-406, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-10-27.

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