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Is Bribery a Good Way to Improve Efficiency in Law Enforcement?
[Je uplácení dobrá cesta k efektivnějšímu vymáhání práva?]

Author

Listed:
  • Tomáš Otáhal

Abstract

The economic theory of the last decades deals with how certain models of institutions and incentives could improve the coordination of individual actions in society. Setting rules regulating relationships between economic agents is considered as the key requirement of such coordination. Nevertheless, the rule has no impact if it is not enforced. Gary Becker and George Stigler suggest a solution that could significantly contribute to efficiency in law enforcement. Gordon Tullock does not agree with their idea. The aim of the paper is to analyze their arguments and to answer the question: "Is Becker's and Stigler's recommendation a good way to efficiency in law enforcement?" The discussion presented in this paper suggests that Gary Becker's and George Stigler's proposal might improve efficiency in law enforcement if certain institutional conditions are assumed. Nevertheless, Gordon Tullock assumes different institutional conditions; therefore, he rejects Gary Becker's and George Stigler's proposal.

Suggested Citation

  • Tomáš Otáhal, 2011. "Is Bribery a Good Way to Improve Efficiency in Law Enforcement? [Je uplácení dobrá cesta k efektivnějšímu vymáhání práva?]," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2011(6), pages 65-79.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlaop:v:2011:y:2011:i:6:id:352:p:65-79
    DOI: 10.18267/j.aop.352
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
    2. Hay, Jonathan R & Shleifer, Andrei, 1998. "Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 398-403, May.
    3. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    4. Gordon Tullock, 1996. "Corruption Theory And Practice," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(3), pages 6-13, July.
    5. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1974. "The Private Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 0062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Banfield, Edward C, 1975. "Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 587-605, December.
    7. Tomáš Otáhal, 2011. "When Great Economists Know a Lot About History," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2011(1), pages 89-93.
    8. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corruption; rent-seeking; rule of law;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship

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