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Disobedience and Authority

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Author Info
Anthony M. Marino () (USC)
John G. Matsusaka () (USC)
Jan Zabojnik () (Queen's University)

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Abstract

This paper presents a theory of the allocation of authority in an organization in which centralization is limited by the agent's ability to disobey the principal. We show that workers are given more authority when they are costly to replace or do not mind looking for another job, even if they have no better information than the principal. The allocation of authority thus depends on external market conditions as well as the information and agency problems emphasized in the literature. Evidence from a national survey of organizations shows that worker autonomy is related to separation costs as the theory predicts.

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File URL: http://www.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_1109.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version 2006
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1109.

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Date of creation: Nov 2006
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Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:1109

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Related research
Keywords: Delegation; Authority; Separation Costs; Optimal employment contracts;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Augustin Landier & David Sraer & David Thesmar, 2009. "Optimal Dissent in Organizations," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 76(2), pages 761-794, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith, 1987. "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 287-335, Fall.
  3. Dial, Jay & Murphy, Kevin J., 1995. "Incentives, downsizing, and value creation at General Dynamics," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 261-314, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Anthony M. Marino & John G. Matsusaka, 2005. "Decision Processes, Agency Problems, and Information: An Economic Analysis of Capital Budgeting Procedures," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 18(1), pages 301-325. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Baker, George & Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1999. "Informal Authority in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 56-73, April.
  6. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    Other versions:
  7. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Simon, Herbert A, 1991. "Organizations and Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 25-44, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Jan Zabojnik, 2002. "Centralized and Decentralized Decision Making in Organizations," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 1-22, January. [Downloadable!]
  10. Luis Garicano, 2000. "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 874-904, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
  12. Canice Prendergast, 2002. "The Tenuous Trade-off between Risk and Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(5), pages 1071-1102, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Marino, Anthony M., 2006. "Delegation versus an approval process and the demand for talent," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 487-503, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Acemoglu, Daron & F. Newman, Andrew, 2002. "The labor market and corporate structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(10), pages 1733-1756, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Davis, Steven J. & Haltiwanger, John, 1999. "Gross job flows," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 41, pages 2711-2805 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Van den Steen, Eric, 2007. "The Limits of Authority: Motivation versus Coordination," Working papers 37305, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  17. Dessein, Wouter, 2002. "Authority and Communication in Organizations," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 69(4), pages 811-38, October.
  18. Lazear, Edward P, 1991. "Labor Economics and the Psychology of Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 89-110, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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