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Dynamic game model of endogenous growth with consumption externalities

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  • Hori, Katsuhiko
  • Shibata, Akihisa

Abstract

This paper introduces consumption externalities into an endogenous growth model of common capital accumulation and characterizes balanced growth equilibria. Contrary to the standard argument in previous studies, we show that the growth rate in a feedback Nash equilibrium can be higher than that in an open-loop Nash equilibrium if agents strongly admire the consumption of others. This result is irrelevant to whether preferences exhibit "keeping up with the Joneses" or "running away from the Joneses".

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49314/
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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49331/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 49314.

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Date of creation: 29 Sep 2009
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Publication status: Published in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 1.145(2010): pp. 93-107
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:49314

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Keywords: Differential game; Consumption externalities; Endogenous growth; Open-loop Nash equilibrium; Feedback Nash equilibrium;

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  1. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329, April.
  2. Harald Uhlig & Lars Ljungqvist, 2000. "Tax Policy and Aggregate Demand Management under Catching Up with the Joneses," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 356-366, June.
  3. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124.
  4. Kagel, John H. & Kim, Chung & Moser, Donald, 1996. "Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 100-110, March.
  5. Fershtman, C. & Nitzan, S., 1988. "Dynamic Voluntary Provision Of Public Goods," Papers 21-88, Tel Aviv.
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  7. Dockner, Engelbert J. & Nishimura, Kazuo, 2005. "Capital accumulation games with a non-concave production function," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 408-420, August.
  8. Abel, Andrew B, 1990. "Asset Prices under Habit Formation and Catching Up with the Joneses," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 38-42, May.
  9. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andes, 1992. "The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1208-31, December.
  10. Stephen Turnovsky & Goncalo Monteiro, 2006. "Consumption Externalities, Production Externalities, and Efficient Capital Accumulation under Time Non-Separable Preferences," Working Papers UWEC-2006-26-P, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  11. Wirl, Franz & Feichtinger, Gustav, 2002. "Intrafamiliar Consumption and Saving under Altruism and Wealth Considerations," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 69(273), pages 93-111, February.
  12. Bill Dupor & Wen-Fang Liu, 2003. "Jealousy and Equilibrium Overconsumption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 423-428, March.
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  14. Vencatachellum, Desire, 1998. "Endogenous growth with strategic interactions," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 233-254, September.
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  16. Chiarella, Carl, et al, 1984. "On the Economics of International Fisheries," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 25(1), pages 85-92, February.
  17. Kazuo Mino, 2008. "Growth And Bubbles With Consumption Externalities," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 33-53.
  18. Akihisa Shibata, 2002. "Strategic Interactions in a Growth Model with Infrastructure Capital," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 434-460, November.
  19. Daniel J. ZIZZO & Andrew J. OSWALD, 2001. "Are People Willing to Pay to Reduce Others'Incomes?," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 63-64, pages 39-65.
  20. Benhabib, Jess & Radner, Roy, 1992. "The Joint Exploitation of a Productive Asset: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 155-90, April.
  21. Dockner, Engelbert J. & Sorger, Gerhard, 1996. "Existence and Properties of Equilibria for a Dynamic Game on Productive Assets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 209-227, October.
  22. Constantinides, George M, 1990. "Habit Formation: A Resolution of the Equity Premium Puzzle," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(3), pages 519-43, June.
  23. Jun-ichi Itaya & Koji Shimomura, 1999. "A Dynamic Conjectural Variations Model in the Private Provision of Public Goods: a Differential Game Approach," Discussion Paper Series 104, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
  24. Liu, Wen-Fang & Turnovsky, Stephen J., 2005. "Consumption externalities, production externalities, and long-run macroeconomic efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(5-6), pages 1097-1129, June.
  25. Easterlin, Richard A., 1995. "Will raising the incomes of all increase the happiness of all?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 35-47, June.
  26. David Levhari & Leonard J. Mirman, 1980. "The Great Fish War: An Example Using a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 322-334, Spring.
  27. Gali, J., 1992. "Keeping Up with the Joneses: Consumption Externalities, Portfolio Choice and Asset Prices," Papers 92-22, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
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