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Public-private Partnerships in Micro-finance: Should NGO Involvement be Restricted?

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  • Roy Chowdhury, Prabal
  • Roy, Jaideep

Abstract

This paper examines public-private partnerships in micro-finance, whereby NGOs can help in channelizing credit to the poor, both in borrower selection, as well as in project implementation. We argue that a distortion may arise out of the fact that the private partner, i.e. the NGO, is a motivated agent. We find that whenever the project is neither too productive, nor too unproductive, reducing such distortion requires unbundling borrower selection and project implementation, with the NGO being involved in borrower selection only.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 4469.

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Date of creation: 14 Aug 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:4469

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Keywords: Public-private partnerships; micro-finance; motivated agent; NGO;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Guha, Brishti & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, 2013. "Micro-finance competition: Motivated micro-lenders, double-dipping and default," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 86-102.
  2. Amit Kundu, 2011. "Savings, Lending Rate and Skill Improvement in Microfinance Operating through Public-Private Cooperation," The IUP Journal of Managerial Economics, IUP Publications, IUP Publications, vol. 0(4), pages 33-51, November.
  3. Maurício José Serpa Barros de Moura & Rodrigo de Losso da Silveira Bueno & Helena Wagner P. Rocha & Patricia Morilha Muritiba & Sérgio Nunes Muritiba, 2011. "An analysis of factors affecting the ethical conduct of microcredit officers," Brazilian Business Review, Fucape Business School, Fucape Business School, vol. 8(1), pages 1-26, January.

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