An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games
AbstractFor any transferable utility game in coalitional form with a nonempty core, we show that that the number of blocks required to switch from an imputation out of the core to an imputation in the core is at most n-1, where n is the number of players. This bound exploits the geometry of the core and is optimal. It considerably improves the upper bounds found so far by Koczy (2006), Yang (2010, 2011) and a previous result by ourselves (2012) in which the bound was n(n-1)/2.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 38972.
Date of creation: 23 May 2012
Date of revision:
Core ; Block ; Weak dominance relation ; Strong dominance relation ; Davis-Maschler reduced games;
Other versions of this item:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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