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Performance of a reciprocity model in predicting a positive reciprocity decision

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  • Bhirombhakdi, Kornpob

Abstract

This economic experiment initiates in evaluating a model's performance in predicting a decision. The reciprocity model is measured its accuracy rate in prediction and informativeness as aspects of the model's performance. Seventy-nine undergraduate students voluntarily joined the experiment. They made decisions contingently in designed situations as the first player in a dictator game and all roles in trust-share games. The study controls effects of choice set (equal split, competitive, and different social welfare choices) and framing effect. The result shows that the model has high performance in both prediction and informative. Furthermore, it shows an existence of the loss aversion behavior, and a significant relationship between decisions in the dictator game and the trustshare games. The study suggests that the more complicated model may not be marginally useful in predicting decision in the positive reciprocity situations.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 37468.

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Date of creation: 23 Dec 2011
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:37468

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Keywords: economic experiment; performance; reciprocity; trust-share game;

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  1. Stanca, Luca & Bruni, Luigino & Corazzini, Luca, 2009. "Testing theories of reciprocity: Do motivations matter?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 233-245, August.
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  8. Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2004. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 268-298, May.
  9. Friedman,Daniel & Sunder,Shyam, 1994. "Experimental Methods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521456821.
  10. Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2006. "A theory of reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 293-315, February.
  11. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," CESifo Working Paper Series 336, CESifo Group Munich.
  12. McCabe, Kevin A. & Rigdon, Mary L. & Smith, Vernon L., 2003. "Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 267-275, October.
  13. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "A stress test of fairness measures in models of social utility," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group 2002-29, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  14. Francesco Guala & Luigi Mittone, 2008. "Paradigmatic Experiments: the Dictator Game," CEEL Working Papers, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia 0807, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  15. James C. Cox & Cary A. Deck, 2005. "On the Nature of Reciprocal Motives," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 43(3), pages 623-635, July.
  16. Csongor Csukas & Paulo Fracalanza & Tamas Kovacs & Marc Willinger, 2008. "The Determinants Of Trusting And Reciprocal Behaviour: Evidence From An Intercultural Experiment," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 33(1), pages 71-95, June.
  17. Bhirombhakdi, Kornpob, 2011. "Performance of a reciprocity model in predicting a positive reciprocity decision," MPRA Paper 37468, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Daniel Zizzo, 2010. "Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 75-98, March.
  19. John Geanakoplos & David Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 2010. "Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality," Levine's Working Paper Archive 587, David K. Levine.
  20. Bhirombhakdi, Kornpob & Potipiti, Tanapong, 2012. "Cost of action, perceived intention, positive reciprocity, and signalling model," MPRA Paper 37469, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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Cited by:
  1. Bhirombhakdi, Kornpob & Potipiti, Tanapong, 2012. "Cost of action, perceived intention, positive reciprocity, and signalling model," MPRA Paper 37469, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Bhirombhakdi, Kornpob & Potipiti, Tanapong, 2012. "Performance of a reciprocity model in predicting a positive reciprocity decision," MPRA Paper 40954, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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