Efficiency in a search and matching model with right-to-manage bargaining
Abstract
In a search and matching model with right-to-manage bargaining, matched workers and firms bargain over wages, given labor demand schedule of firms for hours worked per worker. Wages and hours worked per worker are determined as if they are determined in a competitive labor market with a distortion to wage markups. A positive inefficiency gap in the labor market diminishes workers' effective bargaining power relative to firms, because firms can adjust labor input and wage schedule via intensive margin. The Hosios condition does not necessarily hold even when workers' actual bargaining power is equal to unemployment elasticity of matches.Download Info
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 32503.Length:
Date of creation: 30 Jul 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:32503
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Related research
Keywords: Labor market search; efficiency; right-to-manage bargaining;Other versions of this item:
- Sunakawa, Takeki, 2012. "Efficiency in a search and matching model with right-to-manage bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 679-682.
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-08-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2011-08-09 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-LAB-2011-08-09 (Labour Economics)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kai Christoffel & Keith Kuester, 2008.
"The elasticity of the unemployment rate with respect to benefits,"
Working Papers
08-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Christoffel, Kai & Kuester, Keith, 2009. "The elasticity of the unemployment rate with respect to benefits," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 102-105, February.
- Hosios, Arthur J, 1990. "On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 279-98, April.
- Kai Christoffel & Tobias Linzert, 2010. "The Role of Real Wage Rigidity and Labor Market Frictions for Inflation Persistence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(7), pages 1435-1446, October.
- Kai Christoffel & Keith Kuester, 2008.
"Resuscitating the wage channel in models with unemployment fluctuations,"
Working Paper Series
923, European Central Bank.
- Christoffel, Kai & Kuester, Keith, 2008. "Resuscitating the wage channel in models with unemployment fluctuations," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(5), pages 865-887, July.
- Rotemberg, Julio J., 2008. "The determination of weekly hours of work: A comment on Christoffel and Kuester's "Resuscitating the wage channel in models with unemployment fluctuations"," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(5), pages 888-891, July.
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