Subgame perfect implementation: A new result
AbstractThis paper concerns what will happen if quantum mechanics is concerned in subgame perfect implementation. The main result is: When additional conditions are satisfied, the traditional characterization on subgame perfect implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum stage mechanism. Furthermore, by using an algorithmic stage mechanism, this amendment holds in the macro world too.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 30286.
Date of creation: 13 Apr 2011
Date of revision:
Mechanism design; Subgame perfect implementation; Quantum game theory.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-04-30 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2011-04-30 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research
1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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- Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1990. "Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 285-299, April.
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- Wu, Haoyang, 2011. "Two-agent Nash implementation: A new result," MPRA Paper 30068, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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