Policy Choices by an Incumbent - A Case with Down-Up Problem, Bias Beliefs and Retrospective Voting
AbstractThe main question addressed in the model regards which type of incentives an elected politician has to choose good or bad policies. In order to answer it, we focus on two inefficiencies, recently considered in the literature: the down-up problem and voters having bias beliefs and voting retrospectively. Moreover, we consider that the politician receives utility from holding office and from the success of his projects and, as to his policy platform choice; he can choose any combination of bad (yet popular) policies and good (yet less popular) policies. We are able to show that politicians can choose good long term policy platforms even when those policies have bad short term results. Motivation regarding the success of the projects or an incumbent bias tends to induce the politician to implement a good policy. Unclear responsibilities or campaign promises will have mixed effects on the type of policy implemented.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto in its series FEP Working Papers with number 485.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2013
Date of revision:
Policy choice; Elections; Voting behavior; Retrospective voting; Biased beliefs; Down-up problem;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- D90 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - General
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-04-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-04-13 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2013-04-13 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sven Jari Stehn & Annalisa Fedelino, 2009. "Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System," IMF Working Papers 09/124, International Monetary Fund.
- Enriqueta Aragonès & Thomas Palfrey & Andrew Postlewaite, 2007.
"Political Reputations and Campaign Promises,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 5(4), pages 846-884, 06.
- Andrew Leigh, 2009.
"Does the World Economy Swing National Elections?,"
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics,
Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 71(2), pages 163-181, 04.
- Hans Gersbach, 2001.
"Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
406, CESifo Group Munich.
- Hans Gersbach, 2004. "Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 157-177, October.
- Bryan Caplan, 2007.
"Introduction to The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies
[The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies]," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
- Leiser, David & Drori, Shelly, 2005. "NaIve understanding of inflation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 179-198, March.
- Rebecca Morton & Charles Cameron, 1992. "Elections And The Theory Of Campaign Contributions: A Survey And Critical Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 79-108, 03.
- João Correia-da-Silva & Joana Pinho & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2013. "Cartel stability and profits under different reactions to entry in markets with growing demand," FEP Working Papers 487, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
- Ana Pinto Borges & Didier Laussel & João Correia-da-Silva, 2013.
"Multidimensional Screening with Complementary Activities: Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Cost and Unknown Preference for Empire Building,"
MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 532-560, September.
- Ana P. Borges & Didier Laussel & João Correia-da-Silva, 2013. "Multidimensional screening with complementary activities: regulating a monopolist with unknown cost and unknown preference for empire-building," FEP Working Papers 486, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.