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Contractual Democracy

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Author Info
Gersbach, Hans

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Abstract

Although they would yield social benefits, some political projects may not be implemented in democracies. Prominent examples are the reform of European labour markets, the reduction of government debt or the reduction of greenhouse gases. We suggest introducing political contracts to make liberal democracy more efficient without altering its fundamental values. Furthermore, such contracts can foster the public's trust in politics. We discuss four archetypes of political contracts and ways of implementing them. We outline the certification and control procedures for political contracts and address the major concerns arising with regard to contractual democracy.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6763.

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Date of creation: Mar 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6763

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Related research
Keywords: contractual democracy; elections; political contracts;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Joel Watson, 2007. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 55-81, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Enriqueta Aragonès & Thomas Palfrey & Andrew Postlewaite, 2007. "Political Reputations and Campaign Promises," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(4), pages 846-884, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Nigar Hashimzade & George Davis, 2006. "Human capital and growth under political uncertainty," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 15(1), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
  4. Bryan Caplan, 2002. "Systematically Biased Beliefs About Economics: Robust Evidence of Judgemental Anomalies from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(479), pages 433-458, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-85, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. William D. Nordhaus & Joseph G. Boyer, 1999. "Requiem for Kyoto: An Economic Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 20(Special I), pages 93-130.
    Other versions:
  7. Tabellini, Guido, 2000. " A Positive Theory of Social Security," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 102(3), pages 523-45, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. William D. Nordhaus, 2006. "After Kyoto: Alternative Mechanisms to Control Global Warming," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 31-34, May. [Downloadable!]
  9. Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2000. "Political sustainability and the design of social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 341-364, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Christoph Böhringer & Carsten Vogt, 2003. "Economic and environmental impacts of the Kyoto Protocol," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 36(2), pages 475-496, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Gersbach, Hans & Liessem, Verena, 2003. "Incentive Contracts and Elections for Politicians with Multi-Task Problems," CEPR Discussion Papers 4075, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Tollison, Robert D, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602.
  13. Warwick J. McKibbin & Peter J. Wilcoxen, 2002. "The Role of Economics in Climate Change Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 107-129, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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