AbstractAlthough they would yield social benefits, some political projects may not be implemented in democracies. Prominent examples are the reform of European labour markets, the reduction of government debt or the reduction of greenhouse gases. We suggest introducing political contracts to make liberal democracy more efficient without altering its fundamental values. Furthermore, such contracts can foster the public's trust in politics. We discuss four archetypes of political contracts and ways of implementing them. We outline the certification and control procedures for political contracts and address the major concerns arising with regard to contractual democracy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6763.
Date of creation: Mar 2008
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- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-04-12 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-LAW-2008-04-12 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-POL-2008-04-12 (Positive Political Economics)
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