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Contractual Democracy

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  • Gersbach Hans

    (CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Switzerland and CEPR)

Abstract

Recent contributions suggest that introducing political contracts could make liberal democracy more efficient without altering its fundamental values. Such contracts might foster the public ’s trust in politics. In this article, we review and structure the current state of affairs on Contractual Democracy. We discuss four archetypes of political contracts and ways of implementing them. We outline the certification and control procedures for political contracts, and address the major concerns arising with regard to Contractual Democracy.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Review of Law & Economics.

Volume (Year): 8 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 823-851

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Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:8:y:2012:i:3:p:823-851:n:8

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References

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  1. Watson, Joel, 2002. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt18x0r2nn, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  2. Tabellini, Guido, 2000. " A Positive Theory of Social Security," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(3), pages 523-45, June.
  3. Hans Gersbach, 1998. "On the Equivalence of General and Specific Control in Organizations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(5), pages 730-737, May.
  4. Hans Gersbach, 2004. "Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 157-177, October.
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  9. Gersbach, Hans & Schneider, Maik, 2012. "Tax Contracts and Elections," CEPR Discussion Papers 9054, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Gersbach, Hans & Liessem, Verena, 2003. "Incentive Contracts and Elections for Politicians with Multi-Task Problems," CEPR Discussion Papers 4075, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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  19. Andreas Wagener, 2002. "Intergenerational Transfer Schemes as Incomplete Social Contracts," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 337-359, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Gersbach, Hans & Schneider, Maik T., 2012. "Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 173-192.
  2. Peter Bernholz, 2012. "From The Calculus of Consent to extended logrolling, negative externalities, and the Coase theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 265-271, September.
  3. Hans Gersbach, 2014. "Government Debt-Threshold Contracts," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(1), pages 444-458, 01.
  4. Hans Gersbach & Oriana Ponta, 2012. "Unraveling Short- and Farsightedness in Politics," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 12/158, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  5. Johannes Gerd Becker & Hans Gersbach, 2013. "A Theory of Threshold Contracts," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 13/182, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  6. Hans Gersbach & Oriol Tejada & Maik T. Schneider, 2014. "Coalition-Preclusion Contracts and Moderate Policies," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 14/195, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.

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