The Relationship between Trigger Price and Punishment Period in Green and Porter (1984) Game made Endogenous
AbstractGreen and Porter (1984) made a huge contribution to Industrial Organization Theory where a trigger price is defined by firms and whenever the price falls below this trigger price, the firms cease to produce at the monopoly level and enter into a punishment period. Our goal with this paper is to define, endogenously in the model, relationships between the trigger price and the punishment period, which were set exogenously in the original paper.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto in its series FEP Working Papers with number 432.
Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2011
Date of revision:
Green and Porter (1984); trigger price; punishment period;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-10-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CIS-2011-10-22 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-COM-2011-10-22 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2011-10-22 (Industrial Organization)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Economics Working Paper Archive
488, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Jun 2003.
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