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The Relationship between Trigger Price and Punishment Period in Green and Porter (1984) Game made Endogenous

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Author Info

  • António Brandão

    (CEF.UP, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto)

  • Luís Guimarães

    ()
    (Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto)

  • Carlos Seixas

    ()
    (Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto)

Abstract

Green and Porter (1984) made a huge contribution to Industrial Organization Theory where a trigger price is defined by firms and whenever the price falls below this trigger price, the firms cease to produce at the monopoly level and enter into a punishment period. Our goal with this paper is to define, endogenously in the model, relationships between the trigger price and the punishment period, which were set exogenously in the original paper.

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File URL: http://www.fep.up.pt/investigacao/workingpapers/11.10.10_wp432.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto in its series FEP Working Papers with number 432.

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Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:por:fepwps:432

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Keywords: Green and Porter (1984); trigger price; punishment period;

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  1. Joseph E Harrington Jr, 2002. "Post-Cartel Pricing during Litigation," Economics Working Paper Archive, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics 488, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Jun 2003.
  2. Joseph E Harrington, 2001. "Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," Economics Working Paper Archive, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics 460, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Jul 2002.
  3. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2003. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003, Society for Computational Economics 26, Society for Computational Economics.
  4. Edward J Green & Robert H Porter, 1997. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1147, David K. Levine.
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