In-group favouritism and out-group discimination in naturally occurring groups
AbstractWe study in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in a multiplayer dictator game.� An allocator divides a large sum of money among three groups of 20 recipients each and Self.� Allocations to groups are divided equally among the group members.� The three groups are supporters of the two rival political movements in Thailand (â€œyellow shirtsâ€ versus â€œred shirtsâ€) and political neutral subjects.� A control treatment with artificial groups (â€œgroup Aâ€, â€œgroup Bâ€, and â€œnon-affiliatedâ€) is also conducted.� We find that allocators strongly favour their own group and discriminate against supporters of the rival party.� Despite a strong anti-corruption stance of the yellow-shirt movement members of both political groups are indistinguishable in both favouritism and discrimination.� Allocators tend to be rather selfish: on average 45% of the pie is given to Self, despite the large number of recipients.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 616.
Date of creation: 02 Jul 2012
Date of revision:
In-group favouritism; Out-group discrimination; Corruption; In-group; Out-group; Political conflict; Experimental design;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
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