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In-group favouritism and out-group discimination in naturally occurring groups

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  • Donna Harris
  • Klaus Abbink

Abstract

We study in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in a multiplayer dictator game.� An allocator divides a large sum of money among three groups of 20 recipients each and Self.� Allocations to groups are divided equally among the group members.� The three groups are supporters of the two rival political movements in Thailand (“yellow shirts†versus “red shirtsâ€) and political neutral subjects.� A control treatment with artificial groups (“group Aâ€, “group Bâ€, and “non-affiliatedâ€) is also conducted.� We find that allocators strongly favour their own group and discriminate against supporters of the rival party.� Despite a strong anti-corruption stance of the yellow-shirt movement members of both political groups are indistinguishable in both favouritism and discrimination.� Allocators tend to be rather selfish: on average 45% of the pie is given to Self, despite the large number of recipients.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 616.

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Date of creation: 02 Jul 2012
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:616

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Keywords: In-group favouritism; Out-group discrimination; Corruption; In-group; Out-group; Political conflict; Experimental design;

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  1. Klor, Esteban F. & Shayo, Moses, 2010. "Social identity and preferences over redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 94(3-4), pages 269-278, April.
  2. Jordi Brandts & David Cooper & Enrique Fatas, 2007. "Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 269-284, September.
  3. McLeish, Kendra N. & Oxoby, Robert J., 2007. "Identity, Cooperation, and Punishment," IZA Discussion Papers 2572, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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  5. Gary Bornstein & Tamar Kugler & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2002. "Individual and Group Decisions in the Centipede Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players?," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp298, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  6. Matteo Ploner & Ivan Soraperra, 2004. "Groups and Social Norms in the Economic Context: A Preliminary Experimental Investigation," CEEL Working Papers, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia 0403, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  7. C. Monica Capra & Lei Li, 2006. "Conformity in Contribution Games: Gender and Group Effects," Emory Economics, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta) 0601, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
  8. Buchan, Nancy R. & Johnson, Eric J. & Croson, Rachel T.A., 2006. "Let's get personal: An international examination of the influence of communication, culture and social distance on other regarding preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 373-398, July.
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