Playing Chicken with Salmon
AbstractWild Atlantic salmon are traditionally harvested from both the sea and spawning rivers during spawning runs. From an economic point of view, the return from sport fishing in rivers is several times higher than marine ‘for meat only’ harvests. This situation calls for a side payment regime where river owners pay marine fishermen not to fish, and where both parties gain. This paper argues that the reason why such side payment regimes are rarely seen, despite the obvious mutual gain, is due to the potential free-riding incentives among river owners. Although it is shown that the decision each river owner faces can be described as a game of chicken, taking the stochastic ecology into account may reveal a different pay-off structure. It is also demonstrated that the stochastic ecology of salmon, combined with price rigidities in the rivers, may explain the lack of side payment regimes.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology in its series Working Paper Series with number 7406.
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 29 Aug 2006
Date of revision:
Atlantic salmon; game of chicken; recreational versus commercial fishing; side payment; stochastic ecology;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
- Q26 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Recreational Aspects of Natural Resources
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2006-09-16 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2006-09-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2006-09-16 (Environmental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999.
"Reputation and Imperfect Information,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
238, David K. Levine.
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994.
"A Course in Game Theory,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
- Marita Laukkanen, 2001. "A Bioeconomic Analysis of the Northern Baltic Salmon Fishery: Coexistence versus Exclusion of Competing Sequential Fisheries," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 18(3), pages 293-315, March.
- Reed, William J., 1979. "Optimal escapement levels in stochastic and deterministic harvesting models," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 350-363, December.
- Jon Olaf Olaussen & Anders Skonhoft, 2005. "The bioeconomics of a wild Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) recreational fishery," Working Paper Series 6105, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
- Bjorndal, Trond, 1988. "The optimal management of North Sea Herring," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 9-29, March.
- B. A. Cook & R. L. McGaw, 1996. "Sport and Commercial Fishing Allocations for the Atlantic Salmon Fisheries of the Miramichi River," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 44(2), pages 165-171, 07.
- Laukkanen, Marita, 2003. "Cooperative and non-cooperative harvesting in a stochastic sequential fishery," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(2, Supple), pages 454-473, March.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
- Weitzman, Martin L., 2002. "Landing Fees vs Harvest Quotas with Uncertain Fish Stocks," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 325-338, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marit Balstad Jensen) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Marit Balstad Jensen to update the entry or send us the correct address.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.